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runbook / 001 · Tailwind Resource Group · Customer advisory · Disclosed October 17, 2026

Find the clients on your network that still trust the compromised eMudhra CAs

Eight eMudhra intermediate CAs have private keys that anyone can recover. Browsers block them, but Java, appliances and containers use their own trust stores. Update those trust stores. This page gives you iRules for a BIG-IP egress gateway that show which clients still connect to servers that use these CAs.

Applies to
Non-browser TLS clients; BIG-IP 17.5 and later
Fix
Client trust store updates
Interim
3 iRules and 1 data group, detect mode first
Log prefix
emudhra event=
  1. Summary

    On October 17, 2026, a researcher reported that eight eMudhra intermediate CAs have weak private keys. Six are TLS CAs and two are code-signing CAs. The keys were made with too little randomness, so anyone can recover them. With a recovered key, an attacker can make a certificate for any host name.

    Google and Mozilla confirmed the problem. Chrome and Firefox block the six TLS intermediates. On October 27, Chrome removed emSign ECC Root CA - G3 from its root store.

    Browsers got the fix. Many other clients did not. Java runtimes, network appliances, printers, containers and apps with their own CA bundle can still trust a certificate made with a recovered key.

    Update each client trust store so it distrusts the eight weak intermediates. Until you know which clients need it, the iRules in this page show you. They run on a BIG-IP egress gateway, they do not decrypt traffic, and they start in detect mode.

  2. Does this apply to you?

    You have more exposure if one or more of these statements is true:

    • You have clients that do not use a browser trust store: Java with its own cacerts, appliances, printers, IoT and OT devices, or containers with an old ca-certificates package.
    • You have apps that pin a CA or ship their own CA bundle.
    • Your clients trust Sectigo AAA Certificate Services and do not check revocation. Sectigo cross-signed the weak intermediates in May 2025. Sectigo revoked the cross-signs on October 19, 2026, but a client that does not check revocation still accepts them.
    • Your clients still trust emSign ECC Root CA - G3.
    • Your distrust list names the weak intermediates by certificate hash only. On November 17, 2026, we found a third certificate for one weak key. See "Data group: the CA list".

    Current Chrome and Firefox are not affected: they block the six TLS intermediates. The iRules need a BIG-IP 17.5 or later system that all outbound TLS from your clients goes through. If your egress gateway already decrypts outbound TLS, you do not need the iRules. See "Before you use the iRules".

    1. Make a list of your non-browser TLS clients. Start with Java runtimes, appliances, containers and build images.
    2. Update their trust stores. Install vendor updates that distrust the eight intermediates. Where there is no update, add the intermediates to the client's distrust list. Block them by public key (SPKI) if the client supports it: each weak key is in more than one certificate. Removing the eMudhra roots alone is not sufficient: the Sectigo cross-signs chain to AAA Certificate Services.
    3. Block QUIC at the egress gateway. Drop UDP port 443 so that clients use TLS over TCP, which the iRules can see.
    4. Add the iRules in detect mode. Run them for at least one week.
    5. Read the event=seen lines. Each line names an internal client that reached a destination with a BLOCK, WATCH or UNKNOWN result. Update the trust store on each of those clients first.
    6. Turn on enforce mode only if you need it. Enforce mode resets connections to BLOCK destinations, as well as it can. It does not replace the trust store updates.
  3. Before you use the iRules

    The iRules show exposure. They do not prove an attack.

    What you need

    • BIG-IP 17.5 or later with LTM. We tested on 17.5.1.9.
    • An egress virtual server that is a Standard virtual: a tcp profile, no SSL profiles, no pool, address and port translation disabled. A Forwarding (IP) virtual uses fastL4, and the iRule events do not run there.
    • A syslog receiver that the BIG-IP can reach on UDP port 514.
    • A route and SNAT that let the BIG-IP itself reach the internet, the same way your clients do.

    If your gateway already decrypts outbound TLS, do not use these iRules. SSL Orchestrator, a secure web gateway or an SSL forward proxy already sees each server chain. Remove the eMudhra CAs from its server-side CA bundle. That is a cleaner block.

    How it works

    • TLS 1.2. emudhra_gw reads the server's Certificate message on every connection, before the client gets it. It checks each certificate against the data group.
    • TLS 1.3. The server encrypts its certificates. On the first connection to a new destination, emudhra_gw asks an internal virtual server to make its own handshake to the same address, port and server name. emudhra_probe on that virtual checks the chain.
    • Cache. Each result is kept per destination: CLEAN for 1 day, BLOCK and WATCH for 7 days, UNKNOWN for 5 minutes. A result from the client's own handshake (src=passive) and a result from the probe (src=probe) are kept apart. A probe result never replaces a passive result.

    What a result means

    Result Meaning
    BLOCK A certificate in the chain matched the BLOCK list: a certificate with one of the eight weak keys, or emSign ECC Root CA - G3
    WATCH A certificate matched another eMudhra CA, or contains the text "emSign" or "eMudhra"
    CLEAN Every certificate was complete, and none matched
    UNKNOWN The check failed. reason= tells you where. UNKNOWN is never enforced

    An issuer: match compares names only. It shows that a certificate names a listed CA as its issuer. It does not check a signature.

    emSign Root CA - G1 is in the WATCH list. Mozilla is not removing it at this time. InCommon certificates chain to it, so expect WATCH results for many .edu and research sites.

    What the iRules cannot see

    Gap What to do
    QUIC (HTTP/3 on UDP port 443) Drop UDP port 443 at the gateway
    STARTTLS (SMTP, IMAP, POP) Not covered. These ports are not in emu_ports
    Resumed TLS 1.2 sessions The cached result for the destination applies
    The first TLS 1.3 connection to a new destination, in async mode It passes before the probe result exists. Use hold mode if this matters
    A server that sends the probe a different chain Passive TLS 1.2 results stay separate. event=disagree shows the difference
    Encrypted Client Hello The probe sees the outer server name only
    An attacker between the client and the gateway No gateway control sees this. Update the trust stores

    The iRules fail open. A parse error, an oversize message, a probe timeout or a runtime error lets the connection through. The result is UNKNOWN, never CLEAN.

  4. Data group: the CA list

    The data group dg_emudhra lists 156 eMudhra and emSign CA certificates. 155 come from the Common CA Database (CCADB), retrieved October 29, 2026. One comes from crt.sh, retrieved November 17, 2026. It has three keys for each CA: the SHA-256 of the certificate, of its public key, and of its subject name. The value is BLOCK|label or WATCH|label.

    The BLOCK list has 18 certificates: the eight weak intermediates, the eight Sectigo cross-signs of the same keys, a second eMudhra-signed copy of EM DV TLS CA - G3B, and emSign ECC Root CA - G3. We checked each BLOCK certificate against Mozilla bug 2083449, CCADB or crt.sh. We did not type any fingerprint by hand.

    The second copy of EM DV TLS CA - G3B

    On November 17, 2026, crt.sh gave a third certificate for the EM DV TLS CA - G3B key (crt.sh ID 30002976010). Its signed content is the same as the first eMudhra-signed copy, but its signature is different. So it has a different certificate hash. It is not in CCADB, and crt.sh lists no CT log entry for it. Its signature verifies under emSign Root TLS CA - G3.

    The data group already matched this certificate by its public key and its issuer name. This update adds its certificate hash, so a match can also report match=cert. A distrust list that names certificates by hash does not catch this copy unless it adds this hash too.

    File dg_emudhra.txt

    Save this text as /var/tmp/dg_emudhra.txt on the BIG-IP system.

    dg_emudhra.txtDownload
    Show all 390 linesHide 390 lines
    "cert:0116f17f97cdef4ade2e63cf2c1b064fd99f404d2b914100bc241f0781853323" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-ssl-ca-g3",
    "cert:0164d7ceae5bb909c272af151ff44b1177ae9b47d9424b94f1d9558c30934d19" := "BLOCK|em-dv-tls-ca-g3c",
    "cert:024998101210644f68fae9115543a5e6d26a6db0d2c10366ff2d5bb505d8872d" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-cs-ca-c2",
    "cert:0250c8d47ac74406a9ccff5eb0f84ff85aa4d3e224421241ac54590cf872d458" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2c",
    "cert:029f54fddc7ec492747037a524e9d6a13c80236d53487e75c4edcc191efe70bb" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-advanced-ca",
    "cert:0307bc756aaea5398bf3b47d433d2bcb83470f7fea640753877adefd910e8bf3" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2c",
    "cert:0427ea3cb4a7b4cb205e77a7b166d332bedb8e8ef469bc5e883169c8d0ac876d" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2c",
    "cert:04e6dea261b8720e0525e9da23282100352bdebc119cfc3dbd812c3d68a2bcdd" := "WATCH|emsign-tls-ca-g3",
    "cert:05b30b3fc44f8575334bd812ef9fa8a52a75743e19bc35a5be3912eca62c4669" := "WATCH|emsign-class-2-ca-c1",
    "cert:0bada979b71402fe860696032cf40e9d2a3f41ccb5d03be33fbb94a80d7ffc7c" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-cs-ca-g3",
    "cert:0d6869a2b4f5df77a6afb034225e9bef345743cf306edf36ee35b9d05afad89c" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-cs-ca-g3",
    "cert:0d74ef67c88de3560365e225aef976f915e901347b73352d81ab5b4132bb2150" := "WATCH|emsign-root-cs-ca-g2",
    "cert:0ef7b863faabc384a694ff632daaf9bd31ced23e9246559a59ecd7472754cce6" := "WATCH|emsign-class-1-ca-c1",
    "cert:1159d471b5746802c2f2cb2fffe6d5c332b9319bd52acebfa93aec07544e7c5d" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "cert:121c42490feca63b63e7d068046cc4c5fc58436bf71c97283746f37a9dd67799" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2b",
    "cert:122a5433d8a2a8c501d5e680ab216885a6019326a189df91e8895f8b5ad488dd" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "cert:125609aa301da0a249b97a8239cb6a34216f44dcac9f3954b14292f2e8c8608f" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-c1",
    "cert:1997770a5633fb6d0440abf7d7e87e15d795f094f8c2959dadb00e785866bf48" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tsa-ca-g2",
    "cert:1aa0c2709e831bd6e3b5129a00ba41f7eeef020872f1e6504bf0f6c3f24f3af3" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-g2",
    "cert:1cfc49c38642e8ac8ea3a05b9fbad0a3008f4fce01e0404ab94b872cd615be2d" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2a",
    "cert:259ff0963a0665bf40d92e05e95b960ccb423dbd117482ae647bc7fd5f5ce644" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "cert:291804ec866837cd5af5f4d652f1dcc79bec622d4f9bf4870e5e4d8639df3ad4" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "cert:2997c32befc8dfbfc15981154443e63d5c06620ad408ee41082ba0669c064cfa" := "WATCH|emsign-client-auth-ca-g3",
    "cert:2c15c5e31f6c837dc26d90568b10de51d849e56e90ed25312507d2e108c31239" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tsa-ca-g2",
    "cert:30444f40cac26fff497b1cd00ddf4d81453a8a176272cc34abe35fd564602b1b" := "WATCH|emsign-smime-ca-g3",
    "cert:3094025792039a68af6e553686410bdab7c0d4a36b9084cba64202e35d6ebbdd" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tls-ca-g3",
    "cert:3213ce37224c4e954daaaeedda098eb708911d0548fd3e30ed8ffc1841bd5d65" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-validation-service-ca",
    "cert:3460c02f0b4b06c2739cb0de17b41062b94515d837652aebff77ae87e0930cff" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-dvg3c",
    "cert:37e866582d43c35d7c17d47794b974f291b3047b868dc123382477f7a08aefa8" := "BLOCK|em-dv-tls-ca-g3b",
    "cert:3d4511d0a80aa949a6d99b253a173471797c4459187a6329e736c37cb5493e46" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-device-ca-c3",
    "cert:3f13597d3355d341bd09328aee567d7f4e002d9919b986f9962daff197ea75d1" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "cert:407418904f71b2a0b2e35f45ad88c31125b1c52131d4f72fa821f83a471dc840" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-tsa-issuing-ca",
    "cert:40f6af0346a99aa1cd1d555a4e9cce62c7f9634603ee406615833dc8c8d00367" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-g1",
    "cert:42c4accd12c4f59597925e1a08a7a90102608543809308d50ec427e118ba1493" := "BLOCK|em-dv-tls-ca-g3b",
    "cert:42da1c562f80e46da7a321244efc23d0faa9febbb7aa0377d96b42d9e88ab200" := "WATCH|emsign-class-3-ca-g1",
    "cert:432ec25f0d28de9006d97bf752f17bbb2cd41f669933fcb072d9a1148d0261f3" := "BLOCK|em-ev-tls-ca-g3c",
    "cert:4334eeb2cc114f82bee6f8a7e5aea03a42eb2e1f70cbd66102e414d72f0033b9" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-ssl-ca-g1",
    "cert:43785b01437218b8d57c2a5b5979976ecaf06b35a710a5ca4bb3c0c1ba65a078" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2b",
    "cert:45a883f349aedfd5f3a649b5498ffb121712ba8b448f3f2a91dbc5a766fcddbe" := "BLOCK|em-dv-tls-ca-g3b",
    "cert:46cd083b47e80402028df493960ea19c85fe851950d5165f1c7da4faa951e2f8" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-c2",
    "cert:47911bc8f32a11b029e0bb10a348b459404b87731b870a2f3fa97b4705dc4c25" := "WATCH|emsign-root-smime-ca-g1",
    "cert:47b2efbc3670e7db4b41f22c51fc02ee84fb2dbf3082a49f2c2688122e9210a1" := "WATCH|emsign-ssl-ca-g1",
    "cert:4896d51f6537a5326272c412bc75990e15d4f5ecdc2946c19776923b8e169e93" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "cert:4b2460a466f95fd40113bcdcca2ceb29b3b093921de45474da7df48874c630b1" := "BLOCK|em-ov-cs-ca-g3c",
    "cert:4c9198b673550858799ad2744cc083c1ba0027e77d3b8fd6d56cf53620d099e2" := "WATCH|emsign-device-ca-g1",
    "cert:4d15e5199d88eab1838e06eba08bc690e971b4b1fcd77a6530e9c06f17fdf477" := "WATCH|emsign-time-stamping-ca-c1",
    "cert:4e9b731567177e1776a96d66d9120b3deb28b800937ea4662565b3ef5ec8000b" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-2-ca-g3",
    "cert:4ffc3046410087c23d2873cd947c8c25422114254bc1567d4c33f35723eba93b" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g3a",
    "cert:53bb70186a0d70a2f66592725f9bc1221d24c02de6305d05b16a9550b0fae541" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2a-1",
    "cert:566b3af3cb6663a9f9e21eef820889c2d1a4ea2f7df0b7bb0d5060249870fa08" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-ovg3c",
    "cert:571fc70654ab8c1aa3b4a261a3d505fae10bc4558fa17c72849b6b98bc845cae" := "WATCH|emsign-time-stamping-ca-c2",
    "cert:579480aea166290bd3c643589e795fc0d0e54e86505d180f1dff99efd3199512" := "BLOCK|em-ev-tls-ca-g3b",
    "cert:5a9a03f2d3fe589be63cda11820a9f25f074c92034f51c047d34226d252ec025" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-3-ca-c3",
    "cert:5f0d6380b345d409c641d089b081d7b43b365fd413994403301671c3cbc6a3e5" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2b",
    "cert:5f1ded4dd590af74631290cf073b122a2aac6a1fa479778a0bd43579bd832699" := "BLOCK|em-ov-tls-ca-g3b",
    "cert:5f2f050f9cdd928fe50102244733cba7ea72204d9a7686949ce59e402ad1aab9" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-evg3c",
    "cert:62b7f9868263f72f6911fc78ceaf72c1979158b7368bf648683bb2aa39b02e72" := "BLOCK|em-dv-tls-ca-g3c",
    "cert:62ced756e591fa0b621805f18cdf54b422dca9d371bb26e881dcc61101c8d47c" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g3a",
    "cert:63088538028e233c61b54c5a4238b7c753c04f32362f1c95a428d28e9cb6b15e" := "WATCH|emsign-root-client-auth-ca-g3",
    "cert:63a8369dc824a42bc7ae6ee5d26aafd32df4af677ca18b941b7a57e33b1e3559" := "WATCH|emsign-class-2-ca-g1",
    "cert:684b11e56ab72502b75daca1cd009e3dd4beab3ac1fe448902d272766cca797e" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "cert:6984c2ccc0749f56449de150c23975efdc4d311e90308a622c3641d5abb4312d" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2a",
    "cert:69b0dd09b98f36a9cc7bd7ffe8a00dcd319a5fc947c9c8af72c92894d8e81092" := "WATCH|emsign-class-3-ca-c1",
    "cert:69e2448c5f03eede5ec2c907efe96c3d33ad679b49cd29c38c5182323121beff" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-cs-ca-g2",
    "cert:6a7a93861982b664001710a0efd04c8a72f6a23e252b280911797e0bf1bd9012" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2b",
    "cert:6b1ea2dee0f34a7e53d64ebbf39c583daf9418d83a5aa9e6258e4f2be707b36e" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-eseal-ca-lp-qscd",
    "cert:6b51d1dcf4eb7aee424185cb1b9580574b39cb963863de3ec1ad31ddb076ce9f" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ssl-ca-g3",
    "cert:6ce3e43327fd6694707c1b87346e26f0bbdae808744d39821be530fe90c1d310" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2a-1",
    "cert:6fb75190477405c28afffe25338a92f4973956ed5b1a2353b24b6204e04d4cf9" := "WATCH|emsign-root-client-auth-ca-g1",
    "cert:7066a0f42f530e0db5afee72a3b04de614e7d2305c67d12c756bb215e37cb975" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-3-ca-g3",
    "cert:70b9ba595412cf8614b76747fd683cca2759f42642164834fbefdd88505c4f1c" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-device-ca-g3",
    "cert:7137fa71ad46ba686f746d1014ac57e8e6c6e9af4aa2f73c0c44a5cf27debb59" := "WATCH|emsign-root-cs-ca-g3",
    "cert:71d2ee4dda251d9244f7ce7c6d478ec552d424ef719f02b71030f2821b6bc853" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-time-stamping-ca-c3",
    "cert:72a9442ac03af1e9d36c2829a43547bc0e7bc53ee346a3f1fc9e283053d0eae7" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2a",
    "cert:7485b51c0ed192878fa1d2f948fb529ae1842cc5086c4b67f7be5b2039de9489" := "BLOCK|em-ov-tls-ca-g3c",
    "cert:75d2ce75979cf2a43b172c9f89f733dda2136031db4bbf3698b053714c077155" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tsa-ca-g3",
    "cert:775bb88fb7feccca55b5b216df40a23f52129ef647ea2077caddee798def9eb0" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g3a",
    "cert:7c71cf3473266c9dbf9c98a504f74982e839cdee481f52934c4bdddcd87e98bb" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g3a",
    "cert:7d9e3951568a20ef05b4880fffb41d2e61aaa7401a7e67c19a3b9c71503e5705" := "WATCH|emsign-tsa-ca-g3",
    "cert:7dd78d5f4f13459a83dff9abbba62edbaf6f2d102bf257fd712f4d9f2746ed8d" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tls-ca-g3",
    "cert:829ec444b8be3dfd2d030a0d9e7a1d0dd2a3c2c325d39589c27ac9a065bae793" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2b",
    "cert:830905812307df14c3d9d71b9a5a83247940857dd20bf6d67f6493d2070da649" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-dvg2c",
    "cert:8344188bcbd9cecb9397436878de8918d6d4521efdb6bde2a30e520847f22901" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g3a",
    "cert:84112972b8e59d14560ae7e7119654474aad119990cf3722bfc1e3b91615e1fd" := "BLOCK|em-ov-cs-ca-g3c",
    "cert:86a1ecba089c4a8d3bbe2734c612ba341d813e043cf9e8a862cd5c57a36bbe6b" := "BLOCK|emsign-ecc-root-ca-g3",
    "cert:873be6f9ef3057221928e840686e2d18211a2680ae07051148c11a29d41ba98f" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tsa-ca-g3",
    "cert:8abfc40faeaf13cbc8bb67b61c8d097a321cd2fee047c54256927e0f8bfeadfd" := "WATCH|emsign-root-client-auth-ca-g1",
    "cert:8c5710bf1601919795673e9ff97f9c19acc7fa478e9e99cb6cf5b612a96c697b" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-esignature-ca-np",
    "cert:8fe4701d088c2250317bb3a77edc1707e38e1112e8a334f615cfa9d46f175b04" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2c",
    "cert:913f1a04b02814b604ac5275acb201b1c802b2c0f1b4986fb1a1eb595958e072" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2b",
    "cert:945caa768ef29ef4e89ec7ea1e9bf0aedc1ff8f89b9af8d1c76e70ffcd4e18ae" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-g3",
    "cert:98b896625c0c230adeec3eb2cf6aad5001ecf9156a68644e82374ce5833bc25b" := "BLOCK|em-ov-tls-ca-g3b",
    "cert:9b913476eab476e21e0887dbcde44345d1359d28116b83b7cd3e87bd807ebf68" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tls-ca-g1",
    "cert:9e39de2881273acc225a149c72ba3e0f51424963669ab633ee1dc7df5db067b4" := "BLOCK|em-ov-cs-ca-g3b",
    "cert:a061d445399714c38fc101a6e9afbdb381f112fa5de7d5bc14904558d1ed3276" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ssl-ca-c3",
    "cert:a2f8ea7537cd5af80d048497a432de5907aee52785d07061462fc511467be720" := "WATCH|emsign-client-auth-ca-g1",
    "cert:a3afd72375c1d7a8330e62d577e13581b72332c8062dfa9cf39e51ae65088582" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-cs-ca-c3",
    "cert:a455eb8d8dc03cc7189b6a9438300d66373eb3225252ced2b12a6d25f0f940e0" := "WATCH|emsign-root-cs-ca-g2",
    "cert:a496e23ac0cab8155fc9b117b97eae368efcbb9041aec8804d5a308d2d01c2d8" := "BLOCK|em-ov-cs-ca-g3b",
    "cert:a57facb931c9a20376e6fe212f7234eff7b8811436a421beff26f5dea9bcc4f1" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "cert:a65160e9770d70d8ace8ec3670a7b4ef1f87f4f507b1ce3d6fc623aded0694c1" := "WATCH|emsign-root-smime-ca-g1",
    "cert:a83559d892f4692da9a088a1b759773015d7aa6fb2b50b18c5f9f89cc27631e1" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-evg2c",
    "cert:aba6a65dce8955baf0685ab88809b7699c174496ef9ee991533251494f43ce10" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-1-ca-g3",
    "cert:b0e6bb9d6e7a94bc4a6b89d96743438d2c565dbb0a697abb21457aca22a13ce4" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-c2",
    "cert:b4ceeba48ef8ccc6090f6d2a62a85dbb51c5a106a7dc7ec5408270020f91c222" := "WATCH|emsign-root-smime-ca-g3",
    "cert:b861bbfbaf92e1fd711baa9b9bcdd6198ba05eb2792364bdfc5b1fd07709695c" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2a",
    "cert:b9e2588e93b5e53617b842e6ed34854ee46ba3d6721ec45dc650ce4439f514be" := "WATCH|emsign-smime-ca-g1",
    "cert:ba02f2f97ba481d19ed4906bab5602a9ce1cce5d1f362eb5ec4f9d828ef09ffc" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-ovg2c",
    "cert:ba0a3da706f47dac1a9c33c4ee1e4d86b726ef48e70d4319f3c949ec673a1975" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "cert:ba9e8a1fcc4154b094be734035eca7e54e9f5619d511b265750eeb982e2c6d06" := "WATCH|emsign-smime-ca-g1",
    "cert:bbd8b3d745efb79198d93b9c482b9d934537325729ea2f02c129261f91be2e3d" := "WATCH|emsign-root-client-auth-ca-g3",
    "cert:bc4d809b15189d78db3e1d8cf4f9726a795da1643ca5f1358e1ddb0edc0d7eb3" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-root-ca-c3",
    "cert:bcdfee2d58c7bf98e60518676c74d798a22d734371c5f56227691398e2c79b11" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g3a-1",
    "cert:c0a578f2109e6f42d3d939948deeab729b20f7b23b4237abd8494df554cf985c" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-ssl-ca-c3",
    "cert:c2e4d1765005d5ca361d400a434b43036dbc931ec6d7b99c17bec030cc74ca7d" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-g2",
    "cert:c3bc2b480fb1a1ab4d0ba1ed6c7b53e096447045733620991a32d6798d77aa20" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2c",
    "cert:c3be06c6b0a92334423180e95ea1e683aab9c3b7d0f5cb8a4f51fbc1006f3dc0" := "WATCH|emsign-time-stamping-ca-g2",
    "cert:c422ab86c1729e889fbcaf5cd73f217e03c29fe2ac50212f451307d915869f47" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-time-stamping-ca-g3",
    "cert:c58e88b283f4c11b08fdbef396c6242f50c51f4e2190f40751fd6983e9efa8e2" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-g2",
    "cert:c83980cf0440cdea950be2c13cc1090f04b8d77e0d50e977588dbddb11cc6da9" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g3a",
    "cert:cb210979924020970337ae32da5c3f981a9e05714ec22bb1c3421fe695e5157a" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-cs-ca-c3",
    "cert:cb6e15165ac802e9b3f993f16c25d41f4e81c21ebde71ae1b012ac00bf9c7c3f" := "BLOCK|em-ov-tls-ca-g3c",
    "cert:ccec157da0f0bd58e3e8b584054fe0c44f04b4dd8c97b75b788d9140b05142f7" := "WATCH|soft-net-secure-signing-ca-c1",
    "cert:cd0edf0feb612d80ceb7d86e99216b43c8a50a6c76ba6a7be8902047dfdd668a" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2a",
    "cert:cef71e70b7c29addf6c30cd19e614b38fd5f02a435a0eeddd0087e183d101a51" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tls-ca-g1",
    "cert:cf6d0333d0be2c69a42d453960dee9e109d9e8843ea3061a1671d6eaf85eb7d8" := "WATCH|emsign-class-1-ca-g1",
    "cert:d034b18751bee10aaaf94c2f14350d3f654e5b934d0dda592b31e58187a48952" := "WATCH|emsign-device-ca-c1",
    "cert:d4317853d206e7c3365abc631df8bb409514f2a41b01a4601e2f6737bccb1457" := "WATCH|emsign-tsa-ca-g2",
    "cert:d5b4a8e4b3e881b6747fdd8a8e8996cd194c016f18bd745fe9f5e09e6b2f23b6" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2a",
    "cert:d62657961ac9c5a9a522549e34cade585ecbfd3869a780c97edf52e0ec90cefc" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "cert:d6961022f9a55bbde793d1bc696d73d7c2569ad55f0fd59910af45449cd9cab6" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2a",
    "cert:d9656f4e4d83f62783d9ade60104eed90d9cc50c29a6ef0a78367751d2f8c748" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-device-and-management-ca",
    "cert:db4591f878f6672f5b70733a66ad7c9537b97e6f0af5ca49aab8ecb2ce02f86b" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-2-ca-c3",
    "cert:db9f48a53106a06a00472ff182914502fe5c816bbc4bb5468332396919bee571" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-esignature-ca-np-qscd",
    "cert:de029e40f6bb851da4b804c65121d8535084fdf6b3b47ddf7e94b4e46a6c3437" := "WATCH|emsign-tls-ca-g1",
    "cert:de767792e870bd32f331029fc89dc24c53f9df970dc70f1ea30cf29db3f94ba9" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2c",
    "cert:e072b30d7f5b8bcf0080e51d6cc7765767072db2319e9bb1cd3d02a086898750" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2b",
    "cert:e0da30ff7384b9873ede9fb2dba7f1353c7e60ed59bb9a43779f9e8494a47bac" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "cert:e21d0ae9d727d235c3078efd155b3c20e019fa323a6be24f93f70f1edc92b351" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g3a",
    "cert:e3473aecef108b1ee6f49e177b25023605a0c041b1d97a9f59cffc00d22e0251" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-eseal-ca-lp",
    "cert:e7568fe6e12331f4fd7de61da4c7559d0f8eb192a218d4741a3ba75184333838" := "BLOCK|em-ev-tls-ca-g3b",
    "cert:e91cad3a096e6c8a19b85435b215d1b7424e47bf9bfc51fdcda95b822134d460" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g3a",
    "cert:ebac91b8ec9853323779edb393c595fadb29dd4ddb20c47e336f2a021684f27b" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2c",
    "cert:ecb8d30846bef4b340c90152659f452fd81a7a4f41429b890f1e2b3467058565" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "cert:ed82135f7d946673f8298bf758dc830bad20fb37f5bb9eac52b236563fec931e" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2c",
    "cert:f1a78e13d7ab31072e223918d257b541010ad93ae6d39f3d74a0d8b2ee4c3e7d" := "WATCH|incommon-rsa-igtf-server-ca-4",
    "cert:f2edaaff3d9b701fb4d14c9f285f8c0bad90fc3bcc1fa07d47f4718edaba34a5" := "WATCH|emsign-root-cs-ca-g3",
    "cert:f3e525e51e2bb27cab003d874566b0b7762b7eac5bebc8cddfdff8b26ad430c3" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g3a-1",
    "cert:f5b3e914cde2954f65464fa8e9d69f0492622b3c2ac243987b11cbbf1b451307" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-smime-ca-g3",
    "cert:f6f159286a1401de5397e21a0090534a85f5e7b9f98fd4a5a47b1dffd4bfded4" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-ssl-ca-c1",
    "cert:f76a0d440c418dc5b362be8e11e0a5d06023f4396093e4f455827bf55153d8a4" := "WATCH|emsign-root-smime-ca-g3",
    "cert:f91aaca0e4e533747a0880bfcf6f26720dc1d05494c3938da6802290d5a09b32" := "WATCH|emsign-ssl-ca-c1",
    "cert:f95d99b74a0fc39b8ff1316523b0e99f514a8187bb94540ebaeba636d4e42121" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2a",
    "cert:fad2e98649f1c606150f55269ebc035aea22ffac131de64ba6900c75d8447b7e" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-1-ca-c3",
    "cert:fbd14d574d7d5223e6715e18ce995d4fd3e986f3e8b0e5d29106e87f7c821e58" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2b",
    "cert:fd9d5c2dbbd4995ab69b8d50c439d9527b00529199c2fd01b2174eb58f07021f" := "BLOCK|em-ev-tls-ca-g3c",
    "issuer:03d961d788a8eeb7fe027780b33b7a36d043a78e048a9997a5d141972d0d4ff9" := "WATCH|emsign-smime-ca-g3",
    "issuer:04a53331ed8c2de6e94b3e007b17d95ee5e5f570554277a7012a8766d6255058" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g3a-1",
    "issuer:04be88bca9273dd6b2e48517245823e769a7f2ecba61b55099054fde5dfde6be" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "issuer:06f585a9b362ed83352b073778c28993e4c30f2b71bf183c3f362217dc19f810" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-ssl-ca-c3",
    "issuer:1105fa706ae2a5c216515a1cca613f36e3a003abf4a404a89657fe31a6b73039" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-c1",
    "issuer:13489abcefe1722a19b6188557fc76b1a42cb1c19b582093d717000cd3a9a4c7" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2c",
    "issuer:15289ca638ed0e139d45f6cd8239c516eccf3b20eaee313266d53449672acd91" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-g2",
    "issuer:173c5bf4320a0dbc4a0bfc238c2cd508acd5cb410ad803ac87fc53710834a89a" := "WATCH|emsign-class-3-ca-g1",
    "issuer:17465923b76a8c73bc9868d67d8255c14cbd2e29762ebaca2087dde6b301bba5" := "WATCH|emsign-tsa-ca-g2",
    "issuer:19d81ee65b757dc8d45bb0b666f6e5b49710148cdc0d7c19b0b754c4ce75e13b" := "WATCH|emsign-device-ca-g1",
    "issuer:1d5912f928439ced229fe7cee1d551688c309fc120d78798ae9072a2ae2661cd" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2b",
    "issuer:1db36ead25534184dcaca4c6ffd264c27031f3afb2c0e7c5557bfb62d5073da1" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2a",
    "issuer:1e40cfb4acc2496268d0c17988cb0a99bf12e82f4dd9403cdd36458f8494ffb1" := "WATCH|emsign-smime-ca-g1",
    "issuer:1f72d8f2921a4702cd9a3a89f0ba836b9c0558cf89ec8eda554018eabaa3cd97" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-evg2c",
    "issuer:20de132cef287fee243410da6e68382dcf25a246efd74624af497d1ed4915917" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-dvg2c",
    "issuer:2153884699479b60a5537cdcb696267fabe7eba87626b1e006ee0f50af486e9b" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-cs-ca-g3",
    "issuer:239d5ef46277cd6e76377925d7bfa9870c2bde8facdee24a25200338bc18f8da" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ssl-ca-c3",
    "issuer:25080084d210c6e9b4788e890df3aaaee60839d0a438d7cc42bcd8a22d41dd20" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-1-ca-c3",
    "issuer:2630f16efda11df91fbb2e429bf5f960d069fe237e2984b7f9b4781262d857c6" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g3a",
    "issuer:263b69f9c18e2d2167dec595b95c3152ff660339ff27d0f4d1e5db7b47c60240" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-root-ca-c3",
    "issuer:28f2a626d9d68e5eb0eb77c1719fa7f3c0a85f34d0713ecde5b7f28208f2e8fc" := "WATCH|emsign-class-3-ca-c1",
    "issuer:2b87ed16fadb50ff62c819c9060b16ddc20ef681f46c700aaf75dd3c9e463e98" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "issuer:2ba83b556e000fe9dd608fcfd0dc88fff2a4e9278456519c6e5a0d18956c8cb9" := "BLOCK|em-ov-tls-ca-g3c",
    "issuer:2bb9c2699fbf79cc0a8c4c19500559175754e39692b3ee36f2facad364350496" := "WATCH|emsign-ssl-ca-c1",
    "issuer:2ee85da7971618b715feb42bc6e9d655f4f65ff8041cb6be9f462d8bf6f33896" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-ovg2c",
    "issuer:31be3574579cce762ffe9b41c06a6d20c20fcc7516207782e3a4120dc6770920" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g3a",
    "issuer:3290d912a90e2e9100eb6398f9fae9008144c39870bae94b2350fd9e58596ea1" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2a",
    "issuer:3392d11f14c236e970201470bc6d97e081b69331a43b9f3f39e77f052e9bbd06" := "WATCH|emsign-time-stamping-ca-g2",
    "issuer:346c5ef0bbcb6381445a2afb2171afe56568b6500178d62dd1a9bd883bbb8afe" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2a",
    "issuer:3727ea1fc7156f95e4f9525e22088b0492f17f32ef954958db88ac02bd822c03" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-ovg3c",
    "issuer:3a3fc3dd741ac7073bbcf2d3ebf6f0ceae45dc645fdc7aa3e4e41439928c8f9d" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-cs-ca-c2",
    "issuer:3d872f6b4574dec26589e54a6eac3146ecb5769db8538b189621d6c862ee4e91" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-cs-ca-c3",
    "issuer:4103a5ebdfef34f4b338504649d541e602b5e6a53e81003816e67ed2f21e2360" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tsa-ca-g2",
    "issuer:417e40b6fc62bebe729ad5b3b95e452917584d28c4735c706495c4f80b786fe6" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-c2",
    "issuer:42d496f73693c5f1ff56e547f198b6f09745cf47596f2b6486927e9ed605d73c" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g3a",
    "issuer:44148f5b3a16968e8cc770525170abbdffeaf3b9ff8c312b6545f918c89225a6" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2a",
    "issuer:446d70f6d448cbf01af4b41b26bda27bd84d2a62da28f34c133ac5764c58afd5" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-c2",
    "issuer:48ca076ba8012ff6ee2cd27c1dfe23fcc8ea0f2d99d55244658747cebab79f89" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-dvg3c",
    "issuer:4f99e5048e918d010796e4b38f4cbe5c1bd187a1f66b62d7284d9345bfa3f557" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "issuer:50b69d954394ef5935f2732429f92e62ad88aa8bc8efd8040285c1f830bb6e54" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ssl-ca-g3",
    "issuer:586744d53ff5ea57984560545eca65b91ee6420ec42408e34da242153939c24f" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-g2",
    "issuer:58a19d4660e0f37fc1f89f668c5f8f5371da70d9d0ee8e6ed2a67550371c4372" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2b",
    "issuer:58b4ed2d2de35221df44f6081fc1d36b8bb689617704361fcf7e7a2025c79024" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2c",
    "issuer:5a3ff6aeb1b3abb460841096198ef93d35ff5eb61696828d16cea83c23d705b3" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-cs-ca-g2",
    "issuer:5bd534070e66b885dbc9bc919b7528e7e051c94606167b29d6d4c8c76e86e215" := "WATCH|emsign-time-stamping-ca-c2",
    "issuer:5c7548cd038e5b5648e967be91cbd2c5957e6ca3eec87bb296e0f1a4ed2898de" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tsa-ca-g3",
    "issuer:61dcfa5eb557c2091fa95760698f021eb1d4fb7bd7579cd178e15777ac23cf1e" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-ssl-ca-g3",
    "issuer:69a911f669b3858e353011622da8b356fdeffb0591594eaf9d4b31a5cc4abea6" := "WATCH|emsign-root-smime-ca-g3",
    "issuer:749277dacc06683f894c804fed5896e76bf155b1de0e1620dab09e9d57b8ac50" := "WATCH|emsign-tsa-ca-g3",
    "issuer:760d6c94a71f3fdb3fe1ee3d9b19de8ec12d3f975cd586a90f0032144450b1e4" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "issuer:777c06a7d4bc7ff0bbada3efdad068bd06e2d41cd93c2814a81adcb4f45fec88" := "WATCH|emsign-class-2-ca-c1",
    "issuer:789b576249dab1c11db99a00a63ffd3109e14227fc4a749e63c5588492ff1d49" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-1-ca-g3",
    "issuer:79d0805530b16c9d902425a475cd1da36471a0b7007ae30810940f6f05e63767" := "WATCH|emsign-client-auth-ca-g1",
    "issuer:8283f3a4c07c2b55b07e66485757541804bd5276acf8c1f49aa8f44bb5115424" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-g1",
    "issuer:82bb6612e81f16c94bd358a2a444837163130627ec2cd21e352a31e77030f751" := "WATCH|emsign-tls-ca-g1",
    "issuer:85ed52d5d58e8bf55b15594b829076b955940a69de1db85f0da17d651e9f16ee" := "BLOCK|em-ov-tls-ca-g3b",
    "issuer:8c8ec020b3b5d06fe87dd7c254b9c18bd44dbea01769aa35dcfc3f803ff21f64" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-cs-ca-g3",
    "issuer:8c9c5a84ee8171464ed6e500ef561a9855a469679507e33e1ec69e3ffbe36f84" := "WATCH|incommon-rsa-igtf-server-ca-4",
    "issuer:9000f0f1fe85dc9a58784aaa66c36464f51a0d8db10b58ef605e9c3655341974" := "BLOCK|em-ov-cs-ca-g3c",
    "issuer:9076cc1b12bc49ed5cb57a5133ee49202edc6be46a86fcb1774908325d8c2e57" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-time-stamping-ca-c3",
    "issuer:9329ad7f86eb90df0f5f9700760db4b96bb0f73a9637b871ea8575445991aebb" := "WATCH|emsign-root-client-auth-ca-g1",
    "issuer:946fd21051a446994209ff6c0754871b552555766b573eb2cb8c0c49dd8c4c1d" := "BLOCK|emsign-ecc-root-ca-g3",
    "issuer:9533106ed082fd659368a08bce716214266029b79147885598fb648a026494e7" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2c",
    "issuer:978a178aa43271ee161ff43e19eefc3f7bf1cc29bce94fc62cb1393f1fdf7248" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2b",
    "issuer:981e7bba4550265e20ccfd9556a77ac2c94431ae6583c64f2a3cdd4fcf691b40" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-esignature-ca-np",
    "issuer:98edae40e3c1f27481a6f9cf59babb7af81152a1dd868345d8fa88358de37670" := "WATCH|emsign-time-stamping-ca-c1",
    "issuer:996bac020089858e0b13a44c0195f8278c1d027bb072b39a2dc9ed8f210d8912" := "WATCH|emsign-smime-ca-g1",
    "issuer:9ea0f1f361d04eb6d98efc1a06b03469f27c45399e6c505ae4a2bf81dc139e97" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tls-ca-g3",
    "issuer:a46f488fc60c4bac23d539ad75d568ef6f10226b1b13062b8de6ea062da59619" := "WATCH|emsign-root-cs-ca-g2",
    "issuer:a5aac97ce69a9da785033e057ed53dfd6440ab75eae25d1355fdf0caccd9faaa" := "WATCH|emsign-client-auth-ca-g3",
    "issuer:a646bb8c05016720b6169f98e226534eb6e66486a990a4721c8f0eb8297f4fb5" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "issuer:a765888c8cb4590cb69c0cc7998473456a8b054c6612614b741b694a46147911" := "BLOCK|em-ov-cs-ca-g3b",
    "issuer:aa3f591c28039f30f68eff691d2a1b3fc34e446db74b9c52625af2efc650a4f3" := "WATCH|emsign-class-2-ca-g1",
    "issuer:ab96ce179f43455aceea204ec60318c235ebcabfcc929788965bf6f3e961e9f4" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g3a",
    "issuer:abe2b3007758280c4f423bb6b59934a51b4d4188978bab086ee21a6f5462e4b6" := "BLOCK|em-ev-tls-ca-g3b",
    "issuer:abe622944f99670bb423f5ab93196a6a9dcfe5de90befba84adbe8a32762b4c6" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-evg3c",
    "issuer:ae1b80a4e35509c0a63ef8b489dbfaf44092c0bae73ae542f78155ff63394721" := "WATCH|emsign-ssl-ca-g1",
    "issuer:af557a3738689b087c7c285b59c4f3af3c824c353e6d74a3d2a63589d1935130" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-2-ca-c3",
    "issuer:b1bf19fa2798dd440c86600e7d6532aa08c5d83a2f3df3539b6effc7aef8c19e" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2b",
    "issuer:b25502005c24e63bd1916d2608165394189048077a96809c3a9d69207f8b147f" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-3-ca-c3",
    "issuer:b2d7c7bf156bb9ae5cf2592a31b3ca0fb196be0d5bbacd93cd43768da2a9ee5a" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g3a",
    "issuer:b3f9161c78412e8ee1aad73e647e44ed36b65936971390de9894b9630af452f5" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2a",
    "issuer:b42291ce4fbbbf2c652c8d1980835ae53079174eb0475c03651129d3588266f4" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2c",
    "issuer:b800f6e6205dcf17f45a63fb0a24ee13b5da30360c6d9b912f218fb82bd6d14c" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-esignature-ca-np-qscd",
    "issuer:b87df89d846b4254c0fcb49da130d69f42bfafa7bd9cbb554285c74b1e8e42d7" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-smime-ca-g3",
    "issuer:bacbdaba3d9667c907bf5d13e0284407edc68d9578c088208b38075c29050fe9" := "WATCH|emsign-root-cs-ca-g3",
    "issuer:bbfbfdc06dd2189875b0f55a921d51d9746ba3186945640f983c58ac853c6a4a" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-device-ca-g3",
    "issuer:bcaea26b32c21af4e5e0846b99f37669a9090a7d3512a83763baa22a0a6a73ae" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-eseal-ca-lp",
    "issuer:bf3a51fb5f95d40dceaf7b4be9a47ae0d700c24c623fb931236aa3abd09121bd" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g3a",
    "issuer:bff5f3ee9d016a8b09aaabf4cfc042a745e6ee910c2dac92e49042bdca3c271d" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-g3",
    "issuer:c04d4486dffa6ed7087329fc0a9596f76093133fe103e866bafb2cc2921ca2d5" := "WATCH|emsign-root-client-auth-ca-g3",
    "issuer:c278a60d0f3d40bfd57fbaf6e6010632ac651fee2dc3da9d8c808f64bdb57f26" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-time-stamping-ca-g3",
    "issuer:c779d5ce7c1c6ad70d17620a643ef0d7776f214b72e7aee9c4ffbbb90da2d854" := "WATCH|emsign-device-ca-c1",
    "issuer:c8475475d29d87dd9ebc8559b3f82ce16074f464a725f4f11aa3ae2619c09eda" := "WATCH|emsign-class-1-ca-g1",
    "issuer:cb93c64d560fe8d954fa874986c5a8205ee3ffcf833d2f95646499b9722c3685" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2a",
    "issuer:ccf99e44c9c5150964e54b236fde3250696f4a5a273ec0cb2f81fc12710a579d" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-advanced-ca",
    "issuer:d2fa891dd62f3c773d41b1ad877bd646b0613335d3dcdc3fa8a1677aee613421" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-2-ca-g3",
    "issuer:d54d3f5c3ddb6311f95c18bd13bbbd28469f0d2eaf483ea48b48dadda7cbb403" := "BLOCK|em-dv-tls-ca-g3c",
    "issuer:d7f27be5cb8537146aaacd602d817ed0c625aa9c875cb6576f590abbcd4f0a6d" := "WATCH|emsign-class-1-ca-c1",
    "issuer:dba12ebfffea9c42795fd9a1c80c171473c9aaf52b62ce4d3b50e949415f61d9" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-device-ca-c3",
    "issuer:dc343d7f1eee898d7c90a1fd8ca01dfdef0abb3a5c34b8750aa2a3371d422af1" := "BLOCK|em-ev-tls-ca-g3c",
    "issuer:deb2a79a7f839257599642d81b169950dbcd9638a424d0cd3553f1b25c6330ee" := "WATCH|soft-net-secure-signing-ca-c1",
    "issuer:df66a4b904ec078f234387e6f2748da8cbc193f1964d67da3fbdedd6a46ee2b9" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "issuer:e1d598ac15f0e04c8f7033efc6d564573bb30030099a7ba2ce386b8342010567" := "BLOCK|em-dv-tls-ca-g3b",
    "issuer:e1f50c8a853cf306f664d327c27d69773826fc41ac059b4530bde54a7f672e48" := "WATCH|emsign-tls-ca-g3",
    "issuer:e37ae6d812637abfac38a9635d780908cadbc2de2f268b9f71d98c846844fab1" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-eseal-ca-lp-qscd",
    "issuer:e4a4b9b0898e0d49539d3ca15dc2c59fc5400bcfded1fe54bcb6a653d04c5980" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-validation-service-ca",
    "issuer:e4ba11b9fa90de3f142f58d0c4a394d240ed5c2b41a59105461aef4f63406651" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-ssl-ca-g1",
    "issuer:e55c94f3b8ad097957ca555149e89aba54365ecfbbc5dabe211eeffa975aac3b" := "WATCH|emsign-root-smime-ca-g1",
    "issuer:e60f4b70b216d7de3b244dc9833f15f4b25ff05775a568d604cbb21feff2e8a0" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-tsa-issuing-ca",
    "issuer:e75d2431dd3245def388b2ad85b269d094bb9430b33393754310129d409c15bc" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-3-ca-g3",
    "issuer:e7cb17cde6415de070fa1d2257412835e3732a747acd47197c30ea76e42f2a7f" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g3a",
    "issuer:ed391c70ce32ca28b03835d668e38cebfcf7747cf5a2636fad593c6973f01efc" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tls-ca-g1",
    "issuer:f064a2176b3b0528eb419e4dccd4248e36c24c606b92370f166883f531b109f9" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-ssl-ca-c1",
    "issuer:f34984e1935517f07ba8f07a1a0fb96fb253b7bf5bb1f99e3a898d188199d12b" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-device-and-management-ca",
    "issuer:f667b0326ec7319e89cee10de5ba5f6bf731ddd9f58ea034fb772f9643e826df" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2a-1",
    "issuer:f730b39b4f69bf089e2a3f381ab00e6b8ee2acae8282c46117f2dd7edb2a98c1" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g3a",
    "issuer:f882cca12f15a1077e3a465d672db24e5b6d7d59ea1837f63a4f6a8580ff8687" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-g2",
    "issuer:f9d172b6153a63546c6cbd0cdc75cbbba5945629f40954160afe082eab9bb18e" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2a",
    "issuer:fa31e29af54048ffd01c4e44a092ab14afe0af4b4cd1df6c7cd33f032fd51614" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2a",
    "issuer:fe5f9f2e32c495a688630acdd80c47a50b4e5d1910256fb005c2553e0cafea00" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-cs-ca-c3",
    "spki:0169613548123dab14afffcb5a3f0e804c70ac903f29ecad55ed43dc75f13881" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2b",
    "spki:04db3b7ddf683b1d4b5b64fe743a3a8d8c3d71f0c339d7dc25b343e665a9eb5b" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2b",
    "spki:0a11949b826e7d00a0c5f8d310b2d0d53f77f8402e03742b70a28550094a09da" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-cs-ca-g3",
    "spki:0a6c2b2ca5b364207954171987ac9d2178561569d8205457e77ca90c32ede282" := "WATCH|emsign-root-cs-ca-g3",
    "spki:0ce39965f7e40aab1da0295834788f192da49a0f216be9248d9bde82b3ad7a95" := "WATCH|emsign-time-stamping-ca-g2",
    "spki:0d7374f51e62e4da75736da7746ac9fcca1eb4e8e0c6575dfb3b8c55665b9c66" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-eseal-ca-lp-qscd",
    "spki:0f9db7a54896c137102f9d992e4413e49716bbeee02bb834d7e747562542e6b9" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-g3",
    "spki:0fa07b240a5441b610cca2789d747dcdcfe3a396d6e7bda6496b6f91efa90e0a" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-cs-ca-c2",
    "spki:10999cc87382ee51772de4f6b40e8d11e880ada388780f52d54629b74db191f3" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-cs-ca-g3",
    "spki:11567f2aaf4325c4044880c6ed2b37f1ca2586d87059cf254934d97c4fee89a5" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tsa-ca-g3",
    "spki:120a54edbb14d3cbd2b33ebf67010220374ae6c4f881dea68937bf8bff7174ad" := "WATCH|emsign-client-auth-ca-g1",
    "spki:12a9538ef01c1f70e01e23134d0657940e390b2af2fd972f99e1284669c49799" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-1-ca-c3",
    "spki:12dd68cd491523b8e627ab6f192d32d6cbb3655275c17afa61bc511e7ca34d4c" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2a-1",
    "spki:15376f44b0b1857bf376a7326727ad61ee0d69e0ffc21868da978c067bf2dffd" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-cs-ca-c3",
    "spki:1a942e3925b809896b4b291a8cd2e7bc5f1d533aa523b8353b2df377b0f0adbe" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2c",
    "spki:1cbbd4cb5eec6a287e34636c07c78378fa3eb3c6d3fb0563286870f283d87034" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tsa-ca-g2",
    "spki:22fc3bc2fe57a5c91f74594ec63dfb4810f0888d16021929d56386137af606f5" := "WATCH|emsign-device-ca-g1",
    "spki:23aef4af7046d73d0a5e9acee45fc0eab0208d2f1e81ad31c623cadbd6461ff2" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-esignature-ca-np-qscd",
    "spki:27616f251b91b3df6a241b45854a5db0a7b1bedd13a296f5cacb670aeac460e5" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "spki:278aea3b0066f410f0a74b6d341de6e4ef0c805cb4d079d02c79a91a174b7837" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-c2",
    "spki:2ff90b0e2bd10089c13500a8cb86bee9027f7a71f12a1c074aa07bb8a08e2724" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "spki:32159657965e44ec9b1b7f0933475009e50479a0fae1dfbb236a8dad4ff7a6a6" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g3a",
    "spki:33836758bd871b8d464bd669b0b81832880b81e363fb8cbb21ba8e843a138858" := "WATCH|emsign-root-smime-ca-g1",
    "spki:34556838281688d1c967d43d1372a1bbaf389277222f03e1017b18b348a1f00e" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2c",
    "spki:376a1a7082a593dccc20d561d119e9ab8d30f11cc321d0a37fa41f0df284e01c" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-g1",
    "spki:38fc3d6e2fb7c591c4c11c5bb1f9f46913be7f1c4acfeb7643f28fea39bea6df" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-g2",
    "spki:3f83a68c4e80fc3f4f487e3105ad146498e56a09a3ea223b2a2982943f5995d7" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-c2",
    "spki:421de4f594192d7ab488fbd77bf4ffeb71f94d2fab65e0fb77b4cc3d80769c34" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-cs-ca-c3",
    "spki:42eddd4b85ac2c08029105b677f0aca89261f77ad3425589be3aa9aa030b0feb" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-ovg2c",
    "spki:43bffa19d6ef651451f6841e019931e96f6f2eaeff28ab4b6f1ce4576de2717b" := "BLOCK|em-ov-tls-ca-g3b",
    "spki:49dd353dc2b919a3770645117d0e60c16115e7d1bc259eefe734b00ea434fe5f" := "BLOCK|em-dv-tls-ca-g3c",
    "spki:4aa7e0e79901d2709e94750e98a013e64dcbdc219c23bdea36b0afaaec4f12d9" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "spki:4cfca6cecda04930a74734fcdddc694c7c5f1a5dad750f6c9e109f5d771e8f2e" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ssl-ca-c3",
    "spki:4e8b3000146768d220e3b7fbc2bd2f46bfb3f76c563f82f0ab8a9b2563eeef00" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g3a",
    "spki:5046252d54982aebf99d11aa0319e02b53fa8e9cb2de8c8b6469c5a5020f4059" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-ssl-ca-c3",
    "spki:562f740ca039a1e6e3fe76b9006fbc103d803b1a7f7b3c564edbe24b5e23a50e" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-1-ca-g3",
    "spki:56ef2b0a6eb61a13e93d422c90010e946fb1fd6244cdce3a36a52b59f7f04d5a" := "WATCH|emsign-ssl-ca-c1",
    "spki:56ef977f0f2900d02301d37f103fe78459aa528ef1eae52e738f5a384e33bc46" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-smime-ca-g3",
    "spki:58d28f754898adee937431d74fc1a3bee02b8a663444f254fc63a9a816f75ab8" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-esignature-ca-np",
    "spki:5bb8639ff2309793b3489b01d68f912171142a136382ab3ef39720b4596210d3" := "WATCH|emsign-device-ca-c1",
    "spki:5c0660a2b164910d8ff589c18e14552e9e0ec237dcefe2cb736d41a4811f81a0" := "BLOCK|em-ev-tls-ca-g3c",
    "spki:5da77dc800f4c6fa93c6015aa6bd898fdb7c28d869e764571b25c00375a77755" := "WATCH|emsign-root-smime-ca-g3",
    "spki:628389a5306d2ff30de784a4b4b8abbdcd1272eb0e0a6ecd6d2476f6ed53702a" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-time-stamping-ca-g3",
    "spki:63ecefee431d49523bc1136c4e72d0206a477086caf606cd5cf025686c109cf8" := "BLOCK|em-ov-tls-ca-g3c",
    "spki:6a8df2fca50bf1410515d15a9ff4ac54a08179814bbd1d5a6282fa7cde817101" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-advanced-ca",
    "spki:6aa600de06d8e834c2f1835a2766ad685d179b871b02d7bb6ec208680ad25397" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-evg3c",
    "spki:6c9a5a1af4fe131a108b6fda9f51c6dcca39c8cae8b74d8e47217f352e69e49f" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-ssl-ca-c1",
    "spki:6ca6b0e819309539b9627e00aa70d74a0919800f8f217e6197fb6946989ed264" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2a",
    "spki:6e915ef2d8286944381a50006b47d45665642c42803b5aecf7110bb3c9dd5671" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-device-ca-c3",
    "spki:71f8adeec2b58adbdf6205c98dde928a4254b03695193d7f9a63a9a2588095d0" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-g2",
    "spki:73061185d2e093cd14796559eecaa57697c57718c4cec4a62e3d3caee2a65baf" := "WATCH|emsign-tsa-ca-g2",
    "spki:73999087c5a025748f16413ba63caa9d4082dd949242cc2a68d2854917fdd573" := "WATCH|emsign-smime-ca-g3",
    "spki:73f0c5be28dc503cd970ad9c452348306d43a38e956979dc1f5a0bf8b039cf64" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-dvg3c",
    "spki:75caea0c53b22717e992c8f3f423bf2127ab3fac265fb558895f134fc53623c2" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-time-stamping-ca-c3",
    "spki:7ba89c4d89ea3c07aa472895e93d59f9d78f8407e3656f516f3162fbf87ce344" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-2-ca-g3",
    "spki:7f4d74d75a846857fa5aaab7c322500aef7a3f5a7821ae1f606f55ffb43a3eee" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ev-ssl-ca-g3",
    "spki:8429351035ba90ba14ef3f7ae38ca35480605a0296aa6c263c6a9b26bb9a48e1" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2b",
    "spki:88bc14017868ffac5c3036b570c80b3e2f13220b292f10353f1448a6cc49b78b" := "WATCH|emsign-tls-ca-g1",
    "spki:89892e3c0b86ebb28b61bb198c593b73a91b27a6d8e024f20cabf983aaa97e1a" := "WATCH|emsign-client-auth-ca-g3",
    "spki:8c26973807c965211c676b2f287279353209a709d0898b27923feb39238de945" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-3-ca-g3",
    "spki:8c7870d7e1c55d0f06d77db49843efaf017371b7e28f4a71241ff1746f04a5fc" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "spki:8d417db2dd8bf5e3084d1e3f196d583849d81bdd4c00c70b9d39369e96b8c782" := "BLOCK|emsign-ecc-root-ca-g3",
    "spki:8dd3d055a7f47ffbca287285dcfd201dde92823ccc484d30f11cc40f079b3a3e" := "WATCH|emsign-root-client-auth-ca-g3",
    "spki:92c063d67e8f14db71d288e11266ffdaf69cbf115f7bab14f3bc2f68d25e0e30" := "BLOCK|em-ov-cs-ca-g3c",
    "spki:941ea0cbce0926d9f34ec667cee669b61fd39f4338fa0b91048d5749d8880d25" := "WATCH|emsign-root-cs-ca-g2",
    "spki:9e466ac372ed264083e2db3b3c6971bbbdfb79c67ead2d9e2bd6ec6bfaffdcfc" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-dvg2c",
    "spki:a3103835ccac5930d0e044fd9830df91fc61ad50e6e10d30d8f5588b395ec6e7" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-validation-service-ca",
    "spki:a4b821003296cd5083060adc331f74fba8372997b0dd75ac75b4cd3838c6c626" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-evg2c",
    "spki:aa4216dc80a7299ae6de08444bea2c588dc873631ebc563c0776d83a1b61e3ce" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2c",
    "spki:aafccd83af8f4bb25b08547e14bf9e01f1593a237aa575ec1f5b5cf5ab87945f" := "WATCH|emsign-ssl-ca-g1",
    "spki:ad446951a423d46ebdb77b1a60f09980c5d4d80b27e18bbfd5da4346154c08a4" := "WATCH|emsign-time-stamping-ca-c1",
    "spki:b4665eba997ed5f662949c2e822b5e14adff401af0cc246945266f5fab80e35b" := "WATCH|emsign-class-1-ca-c1",
    "spki:b59070cae663230be039709cd61524861fcb74ce05a4386370482f6721ef2a74" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-qualified-eseal-ca-lp",
    "spki:b5ee1c904ac2aae39c92601ab466269c0c1cd0b96badbd251b0ed88e6c4ded68" := "WATCH|emsign-root-client-auth-ca-g1",
    "spki:b7408b4d2be0238ba37004dd34e276c6019bd2f24c9db7d4980f5f6c359a4bcc" := "WATCH|emsign-root-ca-c1",
    "spki:bb2b9b953e92b17de687fdc420edbf4efe5fb5170be34c02cc9d06f6b3a360a1" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-ssl-ca-g1",
    "spki:bfd287ea8bbda66b68b51f70aa34a0bd7105fd8ef4212460a49b6dd63884eec2" := "WATCH|emsign-tsa-ca-g3",
    "spki:c073efb31422ff4db99dc24d7442438e942c73cd3c61b529a8ba32542e946b86" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g2c",
    "spki:c12ddf9f09fa23ed1a5fe511aef4623bb84f58f8d39e15f8ba2eaf024ced3a5b" := "WATCH|emsign-class-2-ca-c1",
    "spki:c2690b6bf35a9364e697735ec630bfd9d2cd59040e3908a66765168e3282b04e" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2b",
    "spki:c619e4780ed8e0abeda24ad732567de4383a7ea941338f6d1a7d1b49ac792fe9" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tls-ca-g3",
    "spki:c6fd1e9191185d5e2a09fc5d35674e0292b54ed426a98e3dc91b98443b186f0a" := "WATCH|em-ov-cs-ca-g3a-1",
    "spki:c7bc3a6dc167d21d8664dd741e6cefd1f5493c00ffb6b9f7df06a02360d67718" := "WATCH|emsign-smime-ca-g1",
    "spki:c844c56a21f48eac0437ecb3bbaa476ed9a3804e57cd3dddbe68bf5b36f7d613" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-device-ca-g3",
    "spki:ceb5298daeb8f59279480b46002c89f7755cc3a169514b11b810befc195a00d8" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2a-1",
    "spki:d16f35a2fc245c9aea23050fb48f69240aeb2892466cf998c518139fbd0fec0e" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g2a",
    "spki:d45ce41f3b285436b8fd3e2b68e500f2835dd737035f2bcc489e9e48cf0cccd8" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g3a",
    "spki:d6ec3e6cbf3dbd9ba738f88620d103de81ee0dd0ae8d8a599f0dcf9504a0b1fa" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-tsa-issuing-ca",
    "spki:d7de9c05ce19a59f9d81cd9ff5e888cec4c3287d5470c510925a5eaa3b7cd54f" := "WATCH|emsign-class-3-ca-c1",
    "spki:d8aaa5319de5242ec1734b988bdf330fec7dbd38206caf76656ee4836a216876" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g3a",
    "spki:daa9724da8e1fe403aba0b412467db4e4b376c631eea8dcea4960929f4aeb9b8" := "WATCH|em-ov-tls-ca-g2a",
    "spki:ddb1222b5107b05ff2c87e641d5f6c9d83be852fe28e28ef441092d70aeb02e7" := "WATCH|emsign-class-2-ca-g1",
    "spki:e0254c7fcdc265e2f0f8a428dabb75ab4ae039b4872d62f5ee57f0877d5a8a41" := "BLOCK|em-ev-tls-ca-g3b",
    "spki:e1ba9a97d89e75e299b49f95e907e42ef7232f6627da976f79c2bd32ab0039f9" := "WATCH|incommon-rsa-igtf-server-ca-4",
    "spki:e1dda9bb414de47595a4f6d8bbed1c1f501e099633ddd833f5e15e634c6e4e1f" := "WATCH|emsign-class-3-ca-g1",
    "spki:e842a02a225a2377f842a6f0c245688cd8940bcc8cbf1e11a73c80f29889c3d2" := "WATCH|incommon-intermediate-ca-ovg3c",
    "spki:ea7068b8a34041200a6ccca7db67c29c8dddc312b47e24f852fcdc4e310c40aa" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-2-ca-c3",
    "spki:eabc185c4e82d942b1a5978ba3c0181487d6b3b9974e5c49f72f6d0bd9637150" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-root-ca-c3",
    "spki:ebed6475c2c2d80fcb199f3fe8dd6e6b3ce60b77eb15d4e42c3dec0c6f5b5105" := "BLOCK|em-dv-tls-ca-g3b",
    "spki:ec4ffa1ad0ac88081314b7aaffef6a91f97cd57291bb5ba686c5415f5eb4f6b6" := "BLOCK|em-ov-cs-ca-g3b",
    "spki:ece28e35289ce8621c72407949e5050052ad4607cc332eaf9b546029aacbfb7a" := "WATCH|emsign-root-tls-ca-g1",
    "spki:ed5cb9c88d0b11bf5df5815e1222e13eeaad26683316307cbeab84b8673f7e65" := "WATCH|emsign-time-stamping-ca-c2",
    "spki:eef5de4a7457bcb5ef97d075cf337fc8209e4bc2473ecf681127ee7da0194cfa" := "WATCH|emsign-tls-ca-g3",
    "spki:ef27c5e407461fbe59c7d92cb8219794694841c5e54db3c554e87971c693174a" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-class-3-ca-c3",
    "spki:f1e62919c593884672332ca0d7d43d4fe6c242defcbc68ee24390b535d071b1f" := "WATCH|emsign-class-1-ca-g1",
    "spki:f4ed3c5ea849e062b9aa318d1fd218db85d0c611aff1db056db64304f370d710" := "WATCH|emsign-ecc-ssl-ca-g3",
    "spki:f641fa53945b53104aef0bb3e60b30e6634382e1981d2b10139f3562e2772fc3" := "WATCH|uae-qtsp-device-and-management-ca",
    "spki:f8004e61e811655974f86b81c3787ff52148af9ad389f55a899cfc10b35c60d2" := "WATCH|soft-net-secure-signing-ca-c1",
    "spki:f8db20c2d076249967beea91ec27c954a5d405863e0ed1231c3b8c7f1fbfc7ff" := "WATCH|em-ev-tls-ca-g3a-1",
    "spki:f9990a4ea082fa7ff79287d3c190d850ee903a3b1ea91d5ebb5651fcdaf93d14" := "WATCH|emsign-ev-cs-ca-g2",
    "spki:fa1ea72910c99105c9f46ea1fd31dddada844d1f5daefdd1723abd73fdf934d1" := "WATCH|emsign-smime-ca-g1",
    "spki:fa2e516c2bb85c813250bd791da34d1f110e9c4a8c78a8bd834197d083637bc8" := "WATCH|emsign-cs-ca-g2",
    "spki:fff112fc55c9d5b2616a45455c326d290a17d38f06ec21116d624425da822728" := "WATCH|em-dv-tls-ca-g2a",
  5. iRule 1: the shared library

    emudhra_lib holds the parsers, the matching and the cache. Do not attach it to a virtual server. The other two iRules call it. Create it first.

    iRule emudhra_lib

    emudhra_lib.tclDownload
    Show all 554 linesHide 554 lines
    # Copyright 2026 Tailwind Resource Group
    # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
    # Provided as is, with no warranty. License: https://everythingsfine.io/license/
    #
    # emudhra_lib
    #
    # Shared procs for eMudhra CA detection on a BIG-IP egress gateway.
    # Attach to nothing. Other iRules call these as: call /Common/emudhra_lib::<proc> ...
    # Supported: BIG-IP 17.5 and later. After changing this library, restart TMM:
    # on 17.5.1.9 a changed proc kept running its old body through every
    # config-level reload.
    #
    # Written for the BIG-IP Tcl 8.4 dialect: no lassign, no {*}, no dict, no "in".
    # Every parser is bounds-checked; callers still wrap calls in catch so a
    # malformed handshake can never break the flow (fail open).
    #
    # Data group (string, external): dg_emudhra
    #   "cert:<sha256 of cert DER, lowercase hex>"         := "BLOCK|label" or "WATCH|label"
    #   "spki:<sha256 of CA SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER, hex>" := "BLOCK|label" or "WATCH|label"
    #   "issuer:<sha256 of CA subject Name DER, hex>"      := "BLOCK|label" or "WATCH|label"
    # spki: catches every variant of a CA cert that shares the key (the weak
    # intermediates were also cross-signed by Sectigo AAA Certificate Services).
    # issuer: catches any certificate issued BY that CA, including forged leaves
    # minted with a recovered key. Build it with build_dg.py.
    
    # ---------------------------------------------------------------- primitives
    
    proc hexsha {data} {
        binary scan [sha256 $data] H* h
        return $h
    }
    
    proc u8 {buf off} {
        binary scan $buf @${off}c v
        return [expr {$v & 0xff}]
    }
    
    proc u16 {buf off} {
        binary scan $buf @${off}S v
        return [expr {$v & 0xffff}]
    }
    
    proc u24 {buf off} {
        binary scan $buf @${off}cS a b
        return [expr {(($a & 0xff) << 16) | ($b & 0xffff)}]
    }
    
    proc sevname {s} {
        if {$s >= 2} { return "BLOCK" }
        if {$s == 1} { return "WATCH" }
        return "CLEAN"
    }
    
    # ---------------------------------------------------------------- DER / X.509
    
    # Returns {tag header_len content_len}; tag -1 on error.
    proc der_hdr {buf off} {
        set n [string length $buf]
        if {$off + 2 > $n} { return [list -1 0 -1] }
        set tag [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $buf $off]
        set l0 [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $buf [expr {$off + 1}]]
        if {$l0 < 0x80} { return [list $tag 2 $l0] }
        set k [expr {$l0 & 0x7f}]
        if {$k < 1 || $k > 3 || $off + 2 + $k > $n} { return [list -1 0 -1] }
        set len 0
        for {set i 0} {$i < $k} {incr i} {
            set len [expr {($len << 8) | [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $buf [expr {$off + 2 + $i}]]}]
        }
        return [list $tag [expr {2 + $k}] $len]
    }
    
    # Next DER element at $off that must end at or before $lim.
    # Returns {tag header_len content_len end}; tag -1 if it does not fit.
    proc der_next {buf off lim} {
        foreach {t h l} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_hdr $buf $off] break
        if {$t < 0 || $l < 0} { return [list -1 0 0 0] }
        set end [expr {$off + $h + $l}]
        if {$end > $lim} { return [list -1 0 0 0] }
        return [list $t $h $l $end]
    }
    
    # Raw DER (headers included) of the issuer Name and the SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
    # Returns {issuer spki}, or {"" ""} unless the certificate is structurally
    # complete: no signature or path check, but every length must add up.
    #   Certificate    ::= SEQ { tbs, signatureAlgorithm SEQ, signature BIT STRING }, nothing after
    #   TBSCertificate ::= SEQ { [0] version?, serial INT, sigAlg SEQ, issuer SEQ (non-empty),
    #                            validity SEQ, subject SEQ, spki SEQ (non-empty), [1]? [2]? [3]? }
    proc tbs_parts {der} {
        set bad [list "" ""]
        set n [string length $der]
        foreach {t h l e} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der 0 $n] break
        if {$t != 0x30 || $e != $n} { return $bad }
        foreach {t h l tend} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der [expr {$h}] $n] break
        if {$t != 0x30} { return $bad }
        set off [expr {$tend - $l}]
        foreach {t h l e} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der $off $tend] break
        if {$t == 0xa0} {
            set off $e
            foreach {t h l e} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der $off $tend] break
        }
        if {$t != 0x02} { return $bad }
        set off $e
        foreach {t h l e} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der $off $tend] break
        if {$t != 0x30} { return $bad }
        set off $e
        foreach {t h l e} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der $off $tend] break
        if {$t != 0x30 || $l == 0} { return $bad }
        set issuer [string range $der $off [expr {$e - 1}]]
        # validity, subject
        for {set i 0} {$i < 2} {incr i} {
            set off $e
            foreach {t h l e} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der $off $tend] break
            if {$t != 0x30} { return $bad }
        }
        set off $e
        foreach {t h l e} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der $off $tend] break
        if {$t != 0x30 || $l == 0} { return $bad }
        set spki [string range $der $off [expr {$e - 1}]]
        # Optional issuerUniqueID [1], subjectUniqueID [2], extensions [3]; must end exactly at tend.
        set off $e
        while {$off < $tend} {
            foreach {t h l e} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der $off $tend] break
            if {$t != 0x81 && $t != 0x82 && $t != 0xa1 && $t != 0xa2 && $t != 0xa3} { return $bad }
            set off $e
        }
        # signatureAlgorithm, then signature, ending exactly at the end of the input
        foreach {t h l e} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der $tend $n] break
        if {$t != 0x30} { return $bad }
        foreach {t h l e} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_next $der $e $n] break
        if {$t != 0x03 || $e != $n} { return $bad }
        return [list $issuer $spki]
    }
    
    proc issuer_der {der} {
        return [lindex [call /Common/emudhra_lib::tbs_parts $der] 0]
    }
    
    # PEM (as returned by X509::whole) to DER.
    proc der_from_pem {pem} {
        # "--" is required: a pattern starting with "-" is otherwise read as an option.
        if {![regexp -- {-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----(.*?)-----END CERTIFICATE-----} $pem -> b64]} { return "" }
        return [b64decode [string map {"\n" "" "\r" "" " " ""} $b64]]
    }
    
    # ---------------------------------------------------------------- matching
    
    # Returns {sev label}: 0 none, 1 WATCH, 2 BLOCK.
    proc dg_tier {key} {
        set v [class lookup $key /Common/dg_emudhra]
        if {$v eq ""} { return [list 0 ""] }
        set p [split $v "|"]
        set tier [lindex $p 0]
        set lbl [lindex $p 1]
        if {$tier eq "BLOCK"} { return [list 2 $lbl] }
        if {$tier eq "WATCH"} { return [list 1 $lbl] }
        return [list 0 ""]
    }
    
    # Returns {sev label fp how ok}. how = cert | spki | issuer | "".
    # ok = 1 when the TBSCertificate walk found both the issuer and the key.
    proc classify_der {der} {
        set fp [call /Common/emudhra_lib::hexsha $der]
        set best 0
        set lbl ""
        set how ""
        foreach {s l} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::dg_tier "cert:$fp"] break
        if {$s > $best} { set best $s ; set lbl $l ; set how "cert" }
        foreach {iss spki} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::tbs_parts $der] break
        if {$spki ne ""} {
            foreach {s l} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::dg_tier "spki:[call /Common/emudhra_lib::hexsha $spki]"] break
            if {$s > $best} { set best $s ; set lbl $l ; set how "spki" }
        }
        if {$iss ne ""} {
            foreach {s l} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::dg_tier "issuer:[call /Common/emudhra_lib::hexsha $iss]"] break
            if {$s > $best} { set best $s ; set lbl $l ; set how "issuer" }
        }
        return [list $best $lbl $fp $how [expr {$iss ne "" && $spki ne ""}]]
    }
    
    # Worst result across a chain (list of DER certs, leaf first).
    # Data-group matches win. The string backstop ("emSign" or "eMudhra" anywhere in
    # a cert) only applies when nothing matched the data group: it flags an eMudhra
    # CA nobody has listed yet, and is never stronger than WATCH.
    # CLEAN means "every certificate parsed and no configured indicator matched".
    # An empty chain or an unparseable certificate with no match is UNKNOWN.
    # Returns: "<BLOCK|WATCH|CLEAN|UNKNOWN> label=<l> depth=<n> match=<how> fp=<sha256> certs=<n>"
    #          UNKNOWN adds " reason=<empty_chain|bad_cert>"
    proc classify_chain {ders} {
        set best 0
        set bl "-"
        set bfp "-"
        set bd -1
        set bhow "-"
        set sd -1
        set sfp "-"
        set bad 0
        set d 0
        foreach der $ders {
            foreach {s l fp how ok} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::classify_der $der] break
            if {$s > $best} { set best $s ; set bl $l ; set bfp $fp ; set bd $d ; set bhow $how }
            if {$sd < 0 && ([string first "emSign" $der] >= 0 || [string first "eMudhra" $der] >= 0)} { set sd $d ; set sfp $fp }
            if {!$ok} { set bad 1 }
            incr d
        }
        if {$best == 0 && $sd >= 0} {
            set best 1 ; set bl "emudhra-string" ; set bfp $sfp ; set bd $sd ; set bhow "string"
        }
        if {$best == 0 && ($d == 0 || $bad)} {
            if {$d == 0} { set why "empty_chain" } else { set why "bad_cert" }
            return "UNKNOWN label=- depth=-1 match=- fp=- certs=$d reason=$why"
        }
        return "[call /Common/emudhra_lib::sevname $best] label=$bl depth=$bd match=$bhow fp=$bfp certs=$d"
    }
    
    # ---------------------------------------------------------------- TLS parsing
    
    # Reassemble the ClientHello handshake message from the client's first bytes.
    # A valid ClientHello may span several TLS records, so record payloads are
    # joined until the whole message (4-byte handshake header included) is present.
    # Returns {OK <message>}, {MORE ""} when more bytes are needed, or {BAD ""}.
    proc clienthello_msg {p} {
        set n [string length $p]
        set hs ""
        set off 0
        while {$off + 5 <= $n} {
            if {[call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $p $off] != 22} { return [list BAD ""] }
            set rl [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $p [expr {$off + 3}]]
            if {$off + 5 + $rl > $n} { break }
            append hs [string range $p [expr {$off + 5}] [expr {$off + 4 + $rl}]]
            set off [expr {$off + 5 + $rl}]
            if {[string length $hs] >= 4} {
                if {[call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $hs 0] != 1} { return [list BAD ""] }
                set need [expr {4 + [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u24 $hs 1]}]
                if {[string length $hs] >= $need} { return [list OK [string range $hs 0 [expr {$need - 1}]]] }
            }
        }
        return [list MORE ""]
    }
    
    # SNI from the client's first bytes (record headers included), reassembling a
    # ClientHello split across records. Returns "" when the message is incomplete.
    proc sni_from_clienthello {p} {
        foreach {st msg} [call /Common/emudhra_lib::clienthello_msg $p] break
        if {$st ne "OK"} { return "" }
        return [call /Common/emudhra_lib::sni_from_hello $msg]
    }
    
    # SNI from a whole ClientHello handshake message (4-byte header included).
    # Returns a lowercase hostname restricted to [a-z0-9._-], or "".
    # The restriction matters: the name goes into a sideband request and logs.
    proc sni_from_hello {p} {
        set lim [string length $p]
        if {$lim < 4 || [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $p 0] != 1} { return "" }
        set o 38
        if {$o + 1 > $lim} { return "" }
        set o [expr {$o + 1 + [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $p $o]}]
        if {$o + 2 > $lim} { return "" }
        set o [expr {$o + 2 + [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $p $o]}]
        if {$o + 1 > $lim} { return "" }
        set o [expr {$o + 1 + [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $p $o]}]
        if {$o + 2 > $lim} { return "" }
        set end [expr {$o + 2 + [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $p $o]}]
        set o [expr {$o + 2}]
        if {$end > $lim} { set end $lim }
        while {$o + 4 <= $end} {
            set et [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $p $o]
            set el [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $p [expr {$o + 2}]]
            if {$et == 0} {
                if {$o + 9 > $end} { return "" }
                set nl [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $p [expr {$o + 7}]]
                if {[call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $p [expr {$o + 6}]] != 0 || $o + 9 + $nl > $end} { return "" }
                set sni [string tolower [string range $p [expr {$o + 9}] [expr {$o + 8 + $nl}]]]
                if {![regexp {^[a-z0-9._-]{1,253}$} $sni]} { return "" }
                return $sni
            }
            set o [expr {$o + 4 + $el}]
        }
        return ""
    }
    
    # 1 if a ServerHello body selects TLS 1.3 (supported_versions = 0x0304).
    proc sh_is_tls13 {body} {
        set n [string length $body]
        set o 34
        if {$o + 1 > $n} { return 0 }
        set o [expr {$o + 1 + [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $body $o] + 3}]
        if {$o + 2 > $n} { return 0 }
        set end [expr {$o + 2 + [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $body $o]}]
        set o [expr {$o + 2}]
        if {$end > $n} { set end $n }
        while {$o + 4 <= $end} {
            set et [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $body $o]
            set el [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $body [expr {$o + 2}]]
            if {$et == 43 && $el == 2 && $o + 6 <= $end} {
                if {[call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $body [expr {$o + 4}]] == 0x0304} { return 1 }
            }
            set o [expr {$o + 4 + $el}]
        }
        return 0
    }
    
    # List of DER certs from a TLS 1.2 Certificate handshake body.
    # A malformed list (lengths that do not add up) gets an empty element appended,
    # so classify_chain cannot call a partial chain CLEAN.
    proc cert_msg_ders {body} {
        set ders [list]
        set n [string length $body]
        if {$n < 3} { return [list ""] }
        set end [expr {3 + [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u24 $body 0]}]
        set ok [expr {$end == $n}]
        if {$end > $n} { set end $n }
        set o 3
        while {$o + 3 <= $end} {
            set cl [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u24 $body $o]
            if {$o + 3 + $cl > $end} { break }
            lappend ders [string range $body [expr {$o + 3}] [expr {$o + 2 + $cl}]]
            set o [expr {$o + 3 + $cl}]
        }
        if {!$ok || $o != $end} { lappend ders "" }
        return $ders
    }
    
    # Walks the server's first flight (record headers included). Returns one of:
    #   MORE           need more bytes
    #   NOTTLS         first record is not a handshake
    #   TLS13          server chose TLS 1.3; the chain is encrypted
    #   NOCERT         resumption, PSK or anonymous; no Certificate message
    #   CERT <verdict> classify_chain result for the chain the server sent
    proc parse_server_flight {p} {
        set n [string length $p]
        if {$n < 5} { return "MORE" }
        if {[call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $p 0] != 22} { return "NOTTLS" }
        set hs ""
        set off 0
        set other 0
        while {$off + 5 <= $n} {
            set rt [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $p $off]
            set rl [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u16 $p [expr {$off + 3}]]
            if {$rt != 22} { set other 1 ; break }
            if {$off + 5 + $rl > $n} { break }
            append hs [string range $p [expr {$off + 5}] [expr {$off + 4 + $rl}]]
            set off [expr {$off + 5 + $rl}]
        }
        set ho 0
        set hn [string length $hs]
        while {$ho + 4 <= $hn} {
            set ht [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $hs $ho]
            set hl [call /Common/emudhra_lib::u24 $hs [expr {$ho + 1}]]
            if {$ho + 4 + $hl > $hn} { break }
            set body [string range $hs [expr {$ho + 4}] [expr {$ho + 3 + $hl}]]
            if {$ht == 2 && [call /Common/emudhra_lib::sh_is_tls13 $body]} { return "TLS13" }
            if {$ht == 11} { return "CERT [call /Common/emudhra_lib::classify_chain [call /Common/emudhra_lib::cert_msg_ders $body]]" }
            if {$ht == 14} { return "NOCERT" }
            set ho [expr {$ho + 4 + $hl}]
        }
        if {$other} { return "NOCERT" }
        return "MORE"
    }
    
    # ---------------------------------------------------------------- verdicts
    
    # Passive and probe observations are separate evidence and are cached separately:
    #   subtable emudhra, key "<dest key>|passive" or "<dest key>|probe"
    #   value  "<SEV> label=... depth=... match=... fp=... certs=... [reason=...] ts=<epoch>"
    # passive = the chain this gateway saw in a client's own TLS 1.2 handshake.
    # probe   = the chain the destination sent to the BIG-IP's own handshake. It says
    #           what the destination serves, not what a given client received.
    
    # Log priority for a severity.
    proc pri {sev} {
        if {$sev eq "BLOCK"} { return "<132>" }
        if {$sev eq "WATCH"} { return "<133>" }
        return "<134>"
    }
    
    # Cache life of a verdict in seconds. UNKNOWN is short: it only stops a broken
    # destination from being re-probed on every connection.
    proc ttl_for {sev} {
        if {$sev eq "CLEAN"} { return $static::emu_ttl_clean }
        if {$sev eq "UNKNOWN"} { return $static::emu_ttl_unknown }
        return $static::emu_ttl_hit
    }
    
    # Cache one observation and log what is new.
    #   event=verdict   a non-CLEAN result, once per destination, source, severity and cert
    #   event=change    the same source now sees a different severity than before
    #   event=disagree  passive and probe disagree for this destination (once per hour)
    # An UNKNOWN never replaces an earlier real result from the same source.
    proc record {key verdict src hsl dst port sni} {
        set sev [lindex $verdict 0]
        set k "$key|$src"
        set prev [table lookup -notouch -subtable emudhra $k]
        set psev [lindex $prev 0]
        set base "key=$key dst=$dst dport=$port sni=$sni"
        if {$sev eq "UNKNOWN" && $psev ne "" && $psev ne "UNKNOWN"} {
            if {[call /Common/emudhra_lib::first_in emudhra_vlog "$k|UNKNOWN" 300]} {
                HSL::send $hsl "<134>emudhra event=verdict src=$src sev=UNKNOWN mode=$static::emu_mode $base [lrange $verdict 1 end] kept=$psev"
            }
            return
        }
        set ttl [call /Common/emudhra_lib::ttl_for $sev]
        table set -subtable emudhra $k "$verdict ts=[clock seconds]" $ttl $ttl
        if {$psev ne "" && $psev ne $sev} {
            HSL::send $hsl "[call /Common/emudhra_lib::pri $sev]emudhra event=change src=$src from=$psev to=$sev mode=$static::emu_mode $base [lrange $verdict 1 end]"
        } elseif {$sev ne "CLEAN"} {
            set fp ""
            regexp {fp=([0-9a-f-]+)} $verdict -> fp
            if {[call /Common/emudhra_lib::first_in emudhra_vlog "$k|$sev|$fp" $ttl]} {
                HSL::send $hsl "[call /Common/emudhra_lib::pri $sev]emudhra event=verdict src=$src sev=$sev mode=$static::emu_mode $base [lrange $verdict 1 end]"
            }
        }
        if {$src eq "passive"} { set other "probe" } else { set other "passive" }
        set ov [table lookup -notouch -subtable emudhra "$key|$other"]
        set osev [lindex $ov 0]
        if {$osev ne "" && $osev ne "UNKNOWN" && $sev ne "UNKNOWN" && $osev ne $sev} {
            if {[call /Common/emudhra_lib::first_in emudhra_dislog $key 3600]} {
                HSL::send $hsl "<132>emudhra event=disagree $src=$sev $other=$osev mode=$static::emu_mode $base"
            }
        }
    }
    
    # Effective verdict for a destination. Returns {sev passive probe}.
    # The worse real observation wins (BLOCK > WATCH > CLEAN), so a probe can never
    # hide a BLOCK the gateway saw directly. UNKNOWN only when there is nothing else;
    # "" when nothing is cached.
    proc verdict_get {key} {
        set pv [table lookup -notouch -subtable emudhra "$key|passive"]
        set rv [table lookup -notouch -subtable emudhra "$key|probe"]
        set best -1
        set sev ""
        foreach v [list $pv $rv] {
            set s [lindex $v 0]
            switch -- $s {
                "BLOCK" { set r 3 }
                "WATCH" { set r 2 }
                "CLEAN" { set r 1 }
                "UNKNOWN" { set r 0 }
                default { continue }
            }
            if {$r > $best} { set best $r ; set sev $s }
        }
        return [list $sev $pv $rv]
    }
    
    # Client attribution for the exposure inventory, for anything that is not CLEAN.
    # Deduplicated per client, destination, severity and evidence class per hour, so
    # a stronger or more direct observation for the same client is never hidden:
    #   evidence=direct    passive: this client's own handshake showed the chain
    #   evidence=indirect  cache or probe: the destination is known to serve it
    proc seen {hsl client key sev src dst port sni} {
        if {$sev eq "" || $sev eq "CLEAN"} { return }
        if {$src eq "passive"} { set ev "direct" } else { set ev "indirect" }
        if {[call /Common/emudhra_lib::first_in emudhra_seen "$client|$key|$sev|$ev" 3600]} {
            HSL::send $hsl "[call /Common/emudhra_lib::pri $sev]emudhra event=seen client=$client sev=$sev src=$src evidence=$ev mode=$static::emu_mode key=$key dst=$dst dport=$port sni=$sni"
        }
    }
    
    # Clients that reached a destination while its first probe was in flight. They
    # are attributed when the probe result (or failure) arrives. At most
    # emu_pend_max per destination; the rest are counted and logged as a number.
    proc pend_add {key client} {
        set sub "emudhra_pend:$key"
        if {[table keys -count -subtable $sub] >= $static::emu_pend_max} {
            table incr -subtable emudhra_pendover $key
            table timeout -subtable emudhra_pendover $key 60
            return
        }
        table set -subtable $sub $client 1 60 60
    }
    
    proc pend_flush {hsl key sev src dst port sni} {
        set sub "emudhra_pend:$key"
        foreach c [table keys -subtable $sub] {
            call /Common/emudhra_lib::seen $hsl $c $key $sev $src $dst $port $sni
        }
        table delete -subtable $sub -all
        set over [table lookup -notouch -subtable emudhra_pendover $key]
        if {$over ne "" && $over > 0 && $sev ne "CLEAN"} {
            HSL::send $hsl "[call /Common/emudhra_lib::pri $sev]emudhra event=seen_overflow count=$over sev=$sev src=$src mode=$static::emu_mode key=$key dst=$dst dport=$port sni=$sni"
        }
        table delete -subtable emudhra_pendover $key
    }
    
    # One probe outcome for a destination: cache it, attribute the initiating client
    # and any pending clients. Used by the probe virtual and, for local sideband
    # failures, by the gateway.
    proc probe_done {key verdict hsl client dst port sni} {
        call /Common/emudhra_lib::record $key $verdict "probe" $hsl $dst $port $sni
        # Attribute the probe's own result; a failed probe attributes whatever is
        # already known about the destination, or UNKNOWN.
        set sev [lindex $verdict 0]
        if {$sev eq "UNKNOWN"} {
            set known [lindex [call /Common/emudhra_lib::verdict_get $key] 0]
            if {$known ne ""} { set sev $known }
        }
        if {$client ne ""} {
            call /Common/emudhra_lib::seen $hsl $client $key $sev "probe" $dst $port $sni
        }
        call /Common/emudhra_lib::pend_flush $hsl $key $sev "probe" $dst $port $sni
    }
    
    # Cache key for a destination: "<route domain>:<ip>:<port>:<sni or ->".
    # $ip may carry "%<rd>" as IP::local_addr returns it. The gateway and the probe
    # virtual must agree.
    proc dest_key {sni ip port} {
        set rd 0
        set i [string first "%" $ip]
        if {$i >= 0} {
            set rd [string range $ip [expr {$i + 1}] end]
            set ip [string range $ip 0 [expr {$i - 1}]]
        }
        if {$sni eq ""} { set sni "-" }
        return "$rd:$ip:$port:$sni"
    }
    
    # Atomic "first caller wins" across TMMs: 1 for the first caller within
    # $secs seconds, 0 for everyone else.
    proc first_in {subtable key secs} {
        if {[table incr -subtable $subtable $key] == 1} {
            table timeout -subtable $subtable $key $secs
            table lifetime -subtable $subtable $key $secs
            return 1
        }
        return 0
    }
    
    # Ask the probe virtual to handshake with ip:port (SNI optional).
    # The probe virtual records and logs the verdict itself (table subtables are
    # shared across virtuals), so the gateway never has to wait for it.
    #   wait 0: fire and forget. connect + send only; -idle reaps the connection.
    #   wait 1: also read the reply line. Returns the verdict, or "" on any error.
    # $client is the address of the connection that triggered the probe, so the
    # probe can attribute its verdict (event=seen) even in async mode.
    # Returns one of:
    #   SENT            async: request delivered; the probe virtual records the result
    #   OK <verdict>    hold: the probe virtual's verdict
    #   REMOTE <reason> hold: the probe virtual failed and has recorded UNKNOWN itself
    #   ERR <reason>    local delivery failure; nothing was recorded, the caller must:
    #                   probe_unreachable, probe_send_failed, probe_timeout
    proc probe {vs ip port sni client tmo wait} {
        if {$sni eq ""} { set sni "-" }
        if {[catch {connect -timeout $tmo -idle 15 -status cst $vs} conn] || $conn eq ""} { return "ERR probe_unreachable" }
        if {[catch {send -timeout $tmo -status sst $conn "PROBE $ip $port $sni $client\n"}]} {
            catch {close $conn}
            return "ERR probe_send_failed"
        }
        if {!$wait} { return "SENT" }
        if {[catch {recv -eol -timeout $tmo $conn} resp]} { set resp "" }
        catch {close $conn}
        set resp [string trim $resp]
        if {[string range $resp 0 2] eq "OK "} { return $resp }
        if {[string range $resp 0 3] eq "ERR "} { return "REMOTE [string range $resp 4 end]" }
        return "ERR probe_timeout"
    }
  6. iRule 2: the egress gateway

    emudhra_gw goes on the egress virtual server. It reads the ClientHello and the TLS 1.2 Certificate message, records results and logs them. The settings for all three iRules are in its RULE_INIT event.

    iRule emudhra_gw

    emudhra_gw.tclDownload
    Show all 156 linesHide 156 lines
    # Copyright 2026 Tailwind Resource Group
    # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
    # Provided as is, with no warranty. License: https://everythingsfine.io/license/
    #
    # emudhra_gw
    #
    # Attach to the egress virtual that passes TLS through untouched. It must be a
    # STANDARD virtual (tcp profile, no client-ssl or server-ssl profile, no pool,
    # translate-address and translate-port disabled, source-port preserve).
    # A "Forwarding (IP)" virtual is fastL4: CLIENT_DATA and SERVER_DATA never run.
    # Create iRule emudhra_lib before this one. Supported: BIG-IP 17.5 and later.
    # Requires: iRule emudhra_lib, data group dg_emudhra, HSL pool, and (for the
    # TLS 1.3 path) the probe virtual running iRule emudhra_probe.
    #
    # Paths
    #   TLS 1.2  Passive, on every connection. The server's Certificate message is
    #            parsed in SERVER_DATA before any of it reaches the client, so
    #            enforce mode can reset before the client sees the chain. A cached
    #            CLEAN or WATCH never skips this; a changed chain is seen at once.
    #   TLS 1.3  The chain is encrypted. The gateway asks the probe virtual to make
    #            its own handshake to the same IP:port and SNI. That is evidence of
    #            what the destination serves, not of what this client received.
    #   Cache    Per route domain, IP, port and SNI, with passive and probe results
    #            kept apart (see record / verdict_get in emudhra_lib). The cache
    #            limits probes and duplicate logs. In enforce mode a cached BLOCK
    #            from either source is reset at the ClientHello.
    #
    # Every library call is wrapped in catch: a runtime TCL error would otherwise
    # reset the client's connection. Any error, oversize, or timeout fails open.
    # Inspection failures are recorded as UNKNOWN, never as CLEAN, and never enforced.
    
    when RULE_INIT {
        set static::emu_mode        "detect"    ;# detect | enforce
        set static::emu_probe       "async"     ;# off | async | hold
        set static::emu_probe_vs    "/Common/vs_emudhra_probe"
        set static::emu_probe_tmo   3000        ;# ms, per sideband step
        set static::emu_ttl_clean   86400       ;# s, cache life of a CLEAN verdict
        set static::emu_ttl_hit     604800      ;# s, cache life of a WATCH/BLOCK verdict
        set static::emu_ttl_unknown 300         ;# s, cache life of an UNKNOWN verdict
        set static::emu_max_collect 65536       ;# bytes, give up and pass through beyond this
        set static::emu_pend_max    100         ;# clients attributed per destination while its probe runs
        set static::emu_hsl_pool    "/Common/pool_emudhra_syslog"
        # Client-speaks-first TLS ports only. STARTTLS ports (25, 587, 143, 110) are not handled.
        set static::emu_ports       [list 443 8443 465 636 853 993 995 5061]
    }
    
    when CLIENT_ACCEPTED {
        set emu_skip 1
        set emu_sni ""
        set emu_key ""
        set emu_dst [IP::local_addr]
        set emu_port [TCP::local_port]
        set emu_client [IP::client_addr]
        if {[lsearch -exact $static::emu_ports $emu_port] < 0} { return }
        set emu_skip 0
        set emu_hsl [HSL::open -proto UDP -pool $static::emu_hsl_pool]
        TCP::collect
    }
    
    when CLIENT_DATA {
        if {$emu_skip} { TCP::release ; return }
    
        set p [TCP::payload]
    
        # Not a TLS handshake record: stop watching this flow.
        if {[catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::u8 $p 0} b] || $b != 22} { set emu_skip 1 ; TCP::release ; return }
    
        # Wait for the whole ClientHello, which may span several records (post-quantum
        # key shares make it large). Past the collect limit, carry on without SNI.
        if {[catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::clienthello_msg $p} ch]} { set ch [list BAD ""] }
        if {[lindex $ch 0] eq "MORE" && [string length $p] < $static::emu_max_collect} { TCP::collect ; return }
        set emu_sni ""
        if {[lindex $ch 0] eq "OK"} {
            if {[catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::sni_from_hello [lindex $ch 1]} emu_sni]} { set emu_sni "" }
        }
        if {[catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::dest_key $emu_sni $emu_dst $emu_port} emu_key]} { set emu_skip 1 ; TCP::release ; return }
    
        # Known destination: attribute the client, and enforce a cached BLOCK.
        # Anything else continues, so TLS 1.2 is still inspected passively.
        if {[catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::verdict_get $emu_key} vg]} { set vg [list "" "" ""] }
        foreach {sev pv rv} $vg break
        if {$sev ne ""} {
            if {$sev eq [lindex $pv 0]} { set src "passive" } else { set src "probe" }
            catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::seen $emu_hsl $emu_client $emu_key $sev "cache-$src" $emu_dst $emu_port $emu_sni}
            if {$sev eq "BLOCK" && $static::emu_mode eq "enforce"} {
                if {![catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::first_in emudhra_blklog "$emu_client|$emu_key" 60} f] && $f} {
                    HSL::send $emu_hsl "<132>emudhra event=block src=cache-$src key=$emu_key client=$emu_client dst=$emu_dst dport=$emu_port sni=$emu_sni"
                }
                set emu_skip 1
                reject
                return
            }
        }
    
        # No probe result for this destination yet: probe it once per 30 s across all
        # TMMs. TLS 1.3 servers need the probe; TLS 1.2 servers are also seen passively.
        # The probe virtual writes and logs the verdict and attributes the clients.
        #   async: connect + send only (both return in well under a millisecond on
        #          box); the flow continues while the probe runs.
        #   hold:  wait for the verdict. Only the first flow to a new destination
        #          waits; concurrent flows to it pass while the probe is in flight.
        # Flows that lose the election join the pending list, so they are attributed
        # when the result arrives. A local sideband failure is recorded here as a
        # probe UNKNOWN, since the probe virtual never saw the request.
        if {$rv eq "" && $static::emu_probe ne "off"} {
            if {![catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::first_in emudhra_inflight $emu_key 30} f] && $f} {
                set wait [expr {$static::emu_probe eq "hold"}]
                if {[catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::probe $static::emu_probe_vs $emu_dst $emu_port $emu_sni $emu_client $static::emu_probe_tmo $wait} r]} { set r "ERR probe_error" }
                if {[lindex $r 0] eq "ERR"} {
                    catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::probe_done $emu_key "UNKNOWN label=- depth=-1 match=- fp=- certs=0 reason=[lindex $r 1]" $emu_hsl $emu_client $emu_dst $emu_port $emu_sni}
                }
                if {[lindex $r 0] eq "OK" && [lindex $r 1] eq "BLOCK" && $static::emu_mode eq "enforce"} {
                    if {![catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::first_in emudhra_blklog "$emu_client|$emu_key" 60} f] && $f} {
                        HSL::send $emu_hsl "<132>emudhra event=block src=probe-hold key=$emu_key client=$emu_client dst=$emu_dst dport=$emu_port sni=$emu_sni"
                    }
                    set emu_skip 1
                    reject
                    return
                }
            } else {
                catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::pend_add $emu_key $emu_client}
            }
        }
        TCP::release
    }
    
    when SERVER_CONNECTED {
        if {$emu_skip} { return }
        TCP::collect
    }
    
    when SERVER_DATA {
        if {[catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::parse_server_flight [TCP::payload]} r]} { set r "ERR" }
        set v ""
        switch -glob -- $r {
            "MORE" {
                if {[TCP::payload length] < $static::emu_max_collect} { TCP::collect ; return }
                set v "UNKNOWN label=- depth=-1 match=- fp=- certs=0 reason=oversize"
            }
            "CERT *" { set v [string range $r 5 end] }
            "ERR" { set v "UNKNOWN label=- depth=-1 match=- fp=- certs=0 reason=parse_error" }
        }
        # TLS13, NOCERT, NOTTLS: nothing visible to record. Pass the flow through.
        if {$v ne ""} {
            catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::record $emu_key $v "passive" $emu_hsl $emu_dst $emu_port $emu_sni}
            catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::seen $emu_hsl $emu_client $emu_key [lindex $v 0] "passive" $emu_dst $emu_port $emu_sni}
            if {[lindex $v 0] eq "BLOCK" && $static::emu_mode eq "enforce"} {
                if {![catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::first_in emudhra_blklog "$emu_client|$emu_key" 60} f] && $f} {
                    HSL::send $emu_hsl "<132>emudhra event=block src=passive key=$emu_key client=$emu_client dst=$emu_dst dport=$emu_port sni=$emu_sni"
                }
                reject
                return
            }
        }
        TCP::release
    }
  7. iRule 3: the TLS 1.3 probe

    emudhra_probe goes on an internal virtual server that no VLAN can reach. emudhra_gw connects to it by name. It makes its own handshake to the destination and checks the chain.

    iRule emudhra_probe

    emudhra_probe.tclDownload
    Show all 119 linesHide 119 lines
    # Copyright 2026 Tailwind Resource Group
    # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
    # Provided as is, with no warranty. License: https://everythingsfine.io/license/
    #
    # emudhra_probe
    #
    # Attach to an internal virtual that only the gateway's sideband reaches:
    # a standard virtual on an unused address, enabled on no VLANs. The gateway
    # connects to it by name. Create iRule emudhra_lib first. Uses the static::
    # settings defined in emudhra_gw RULE_INIT (cache TTLs, mode, HSL pool).
    # Supported: BIG-IP 17.5 and later.
    #
    # Profiles: tcp + server-ssl "emudhra_probe_serverssl" with
    #   peer-cert-mode require, ca-file ca-bundle.crt, retain-certificate enabled,
    #   untrusted-cert-response-control ignore, expire-cert-response-control ignore,
    #   TLS 1.3 allowed (remove no-tlsv1.3 from options; use a cipher group with
    #   TLS 1.3 suites, e.g. f5-default), and NO server-name (SNI is injected here).
    # SNAT automap (or your egress SNAT) and a route so the probe reaches the internet.
    #
    # What a probe shows: the chain the destination sends to the BIG-IP's own
    # handshake. A server can choose its certificate by client capabilities, and an
    # attacker can treat the probe differently from a victim, so a probe result is
    # stored and logged as src=probe, apart from passive observations.
    #
    # Protocol (one line each way):
    #   in : PROBE <ip[%rd]> <port> <sni|-> [<client ip>]\n
    #   out: OK <SEV> label=.. depth=.. match=.. fp=.. certs=.. verify=<n>\n
    #        ERR <reason>\n
    # The verdict is written to the shared "emudhra" cache and logged here, so the
    # gateway can fire and forget. The reply line is only read in hold mode.
    # Probe failures are recorded as UNKNOWN (short TTL), never as CLEAN. Every
    # outcome attributes the initiating client and the clients that arrived while
    # the probe was in flight (probe_done in emudhra_lib).
    
    when CLIENT_ACCEPTED {
        set pr_sni ""
        set pr_ip ""
        set pr_port ""
        set pr_key ""
        set pr_client ""
        set pr_done 0
        set pr_hsl [HSL::open -proto UDP -pool $static::emu_hsl_pool]
        TCP::collect
    }
    
    when CLIENT_DATA {
        set req [TCP::payload]
        if {![regexp {^PROBE ([0-9a-fA-F.:%]+) ([0-9]{1,5}) ([a-z0-9._-]{1,253}|-)(?: ([0-9a-fA-F.:%]{1,64}))?\r?\n} $req -> pr_ip pr_port sni pr_client]} {
            if {[string length $req] < 512 && [string first "\n" $req] < 0} { TCP::collect ; return }
            set pr_done 1
            TCP::respond "ERR badrequest\n"
            TCP::close
            return
        }
        if {$sni ne "-"} { set pr_sni $sni }
        if {[catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::dest_key $pr_sni $pr_ip $pr_port} pr_key]} {
            set pr_key ""
            set pr_done 1
            TCP::respond "ERR internal\n"
            TCP::close
            return
        }
        node $pr_ip $pr_port
        # Drop the request line; nothing is sent to the server but the handshake.
        # Verified on 17.5.1.9: the server side connects after this empty release.
        TCP::payload replace 0 [TCP::payload length] ""
        TCP::release
    }
    
    when SERVERSSL_CLIENTHELLO_SEND {
        if {$pr_sni ne ""} {
            # server_name extension: type 0, ext len, list len, name_type 0, name len, name
            set l [string length $pr_sni]
            SSL::extensions insert [binary format SSScSa* 0 [expr {$l + 5}] [expr {$l + 3}] 0 $l $pr_sni]
        }
    }
    
    when SERVERSSL_HANDSHAKE {
        set ders [list]
        set n [SSL::cert count]
        for {set i 0} {$i < $n} {incr i} {
            # An unconvertible cert stays in the list as "" so the chain cannot be CLEAN.
            if {[catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::der_from_pem [X509::whole [SSL::cert $i]]} d]} { set d "" }
            lappend ders $d
        }
        set vr [SSL::verify_result]
        if {[catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::classify_chain $ders} v]} { set v "UNKNOWN label=- depth=-1 match=- fp=- certs=$n reason=classify_error" }
        set pr_done 1
        catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::probe_done $pr_key $v $pr_hsl $pr_client $pr_ip $pr_port $pr_sni}
        clientside {
            TCP::respond "OK $v verify=$vr\n"
            TCP::close
        }
        TCP::close
    }
    
    when SERVER_CLOSED {
        if {!$pr_done} {
            set pr_done 1
            if {$pr_key ne ""} {
                catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::probe_done $pr_key "UNKNOWN label=- depth=-1 match=- fp=- certs=0 reason=server_closed" $pr_hsl $pr_client $pr_ip $pr_port $pr_sni}
            }
            clientside {
                TCP::respond "ERR server_closed\n"
                TCP::close
            }
        }
    }
    
    when LB_FAILED {
        if {!$pr_done} {
            set pr_done 1
            if {$pr_key ne ""} {
                catch {call /Common/emudhra_lib::probe_done $pr_key "UNKNOWN label=- depth=-1 match=- fp=- certs=0 reason=lb_failed" $pr_hsl $pr_client $pr_ip $pr_port $pr_sni}
            }
            TCP::respond "ERR lb_failed\n"
            TCP::close
        }
    }
  8. How to install, tune, and remove the iRules

    Install

    1. Save a UCS archive of the configuration.
    2. Copy dg_emudhra.txt to /var/tmp/dg_emudhra.txt. Then create the data group:
    shell
    tmsh create sys file data-group emudhra_dg type string separator ":=" source-path file:/var/tmp/dg_emudhra.txt
    tmsh create ltm data-group external dg_emudhra external-file-name emudhra_dg
    1. Create the syslog pool. Change 192.0.2.10 to the address of your syslog receiver:
    shell
    tmsh create ltm pool pool_emudhra_syslog members add { 192.0.2.10:514 } monitor none
    1. In the Configuration utility, go to Local Traffic > iRules > iRule List. Create emudhra_lib, then emudhra_gw, then emudhra_probe. Use these names exactly.
    2. Create the server-ssl profile and the probe virtual server. The address 192.0.2.53 is enabled on no VLAN, so no client can reach it. Change it if it is in use on your system:
    shell
    tmsh create ltm profile server-ssl emudhra_probe_serverssl defaults-from serverssl peer-cert-mode require ca-file ca-bundle.crt retain-certificate true untrusted-cert-response-control ignore expire-cert-response-control ignore options { dont-insert-empty-fragments no-dtlsv1.2 } ciphers none cipher-group f5-default server-name none
    tmsh create ltm virtual vs_emudhra_probe destination 192.0.2.53:5353 ip-protocol tcp profiles add { tcp { context all } emudhra_probe_serverssl { context serverside } } source-address-translation { type automap } vlans-enabled vlans none rules { emudhra_probe }
    1. Go to Local Traffic > Virtual Servers. Open the egress virtual server. On the Resources tab, click Manage in the iRules area. Move emudhra_gw to Enabled. Click Finished.
    2. Synchronize the configuration to the other units in the device group.

    The server-ssl profile accepts untrusted and expired chains on purpose: the probe must see the chain to classify it. The profile removes no-tlsv1.3 from the stock options so the probe can reach TLS 1.3 servers. Do not set server-name; the probe sets it for each request.

    If your egress virtual is a Forwarding (IP) virtual

    Create a Standard virtual for the TLS ports, next to it. This example is for port 443. Change internal to the VLAN your clients use. Make one for each port in emu_ports that you want to inspect:

    shell
    tmsh create ltm virtual vs_emudhra_egress_443 destination 0.0.0.0:443 mask any ip-protocol tcp profiles add { tcp { context all } } translate-address disabled translate-port disabled source-port preserve source-address-translation { type automap } vlans-enabled vlans replace-all-with { internal } rules { emudhra_gw }

    Use the same SNAT setting as your current egress virtual.

    Do a test

    From an internal client, connect to a host that sends one of the weak intermediates. Change test.example.com to that host:

    shell
    openssl s_client -connect test.example.com:443 -servername test.example.com </dev/null

    Your syslog receiver gets an event=verdict line with sev=BLOCK and an event=seen line with the client address.

    Read the log

    The iRules send their log lines to the syslog pool only. On your syslog receiver, search for the prefix:

    shell
    grep 'emudhra event=' /var/log/syslog

    Change the file name to the one your receiver uses. Examples:

    syslog
    <132>emudhra event=verdict src=passive sev=BLOCK mode=detect key=0:203.0.113.10:443:bank.example.com dst=203.0.113.10 dport=443 sni=bank.example.com label=em-dv-tls-ca-g3b depth=0 match=issuer fp=7e02622a... certs=1
    <132>emudhra event=seen client=198.51.100.23 sev=BLOCK src=passive evidence=direct mode=detect key=0:203.0.113.10:443:bank.example.com dst=203.0.113.10 dport=443 sni=bank.example.com
    • label= names the CA that matched. match= says which key matched: cert, spki, issuer or string.
    • depth= is the position in the chain. 0 is the server certificate.
    • evidence=direct means the client's own TLS 1.2 handshake showed the chain. evidence=indirect means the result came from the cache or the probe.

    CLEAN results are not logged. The other lines are sent once per destination or client in each period, so the log grows with the number of affected destinations, not with traffic.

    Event When
    event=verdict A BLOCK, WATCH or UNKNOWN result from one source
    event=change A source now gives a different result for a destination
    event=disagree The passive and probe results are different
    event=seen A client reached a BLOCK, WATCH or UNKNOWN destination
    event=seen_overflow More than emu_pend_max clients waited for one probe
    event=block Enforce mode reset a connection

    Tune

    The settings are in RULE_INIT of emudhra_gw. Change them there only.

    Setting Default Effect
    emu_mode detect enforce resets connections to BLOCK destinations. WATCH and UNKNOWN never block
    emu_probe async hold makes the first connection to a new destination wait for the probe. off stops probes
    emu_ports 443 8443 465 636 853 993 995 5061 The TLS ports to inspect. Use only ports where the client speaks first
    emu_pend_max 100 Clients logged for one destination while its first probe runs

    Change to enforce mode

    1. Run detect mode for at least one week, and read the event=seen lines.
    2. Open emudhra_gw. Change set static::emu_mode "detect" to set static::emu_mode "enforce".
    3. Click Update.
    4. Do the test again. The openssl connection is reset, and you get an event=block line.

    When you change emudhra_lib

    A changed library procedure can keep its old body until TMM restarts. This is a known F5 bug, ID 2493485. It affects BIG-IP 17.5.1.8 to 17.5.1.11, and F5 gives no workaround or fix yet. On 17.5.1.9, TMM kept the old body of a changed procedure after every configuration reload we tried.

    Use one of these ways to load a changed library:

    • Load it under a new name. This avoids a TMM restart: the bug affects a changed procedure, and a new iRule has none. Make the new library from the changed file, and point emudhra_gw and emudhra_probe at it with the same change. Then update the two iRules, and delete the old library after its connections close. We have not tested this yet.
    shell
    sed 's#/Common/emudhra_lib::#/Common/emudhra_lib_v2::#g' emudhra_lib.tcl > emudhra_lib_v2.tcl
    • Restart TMM. bigstart restart tmm loads the new body. It stops traffic on that unit, so do it in a maintenance window. On an HA pair, restart the standby unit, then fail over.

    You do not need to restart TMM when you change emudhra_gw, emudhra_probe or the data group.

    Update the data group

    When we change the CA list, replace /var/tmp/dg_emudhra.txt and reload it:

    shell
    tmsh modify sys file data-group emudhra_dg source-path file:/var/tmp/dg_emudhra.txt

    Remove

    1. Remove emudhra_gw from the egress virtual server.
    2. Delete the probe virtual server and its profile, then the iRules, the callers before the library:
    shell
    tmsh delete ltm virtual vs_emudhra_probe
    tmsh delete ltm profile server-ssl emudhra_probe_serverssl
    tmsh delete ltm rule emudhra_gw emudhra_probe
    tmsh delete ltm rule emudhra_lib
    tmsh delete ltm data-group external dg_emudhra
    tmsh delete sys file data-group emudhra_dg
    tmsh delete ltm pool pool_emudhra_syslog
    1. If you made a Standard virtual for the TLS ports, delete it.
    2. Synchronize the configuration.
  9. What to monitor

    • event=seen with sev=BLOCK. A client reached a server that sends a weak intermediate. Find that client. Update its trust store. Find out what it connected to.
    • event=verdict with match=issuer at depth=0 and certs=1. A server sent only a certificate that names a weak intermediate as its issuer. A legitimate server usually sends the intermediate too. This can be a forged certificate.
    • event=disagree. The server sent your client a different chain than it sent the probe. Look at the passive result first.
    • Many UNKNOWN results. reason=probe_unreachable, probe_send_failed or probe_timeout means the gateway cannot reach the probe virtual. Check the probe virtual, its route and its SNAT.
    • TMM memory. In our lab, 100,000 cached results used 15 to 22 MB of TMM memory. All results are on one TMM. Watch TMM memory and CPU on a busy gateway.

    If you think a client accepted a forged certificate, keep the logs. Contact Tailwind Resource Group before you make changes to that client.

  10. References

  11. About this advisory

    This page gives the results of our analysis. It is not a statement from eMudhra, Google, Mozilla, Sectigo or F5. Google and Mozilla confirmed the weak keys and published their blocks. The CA list comes from CCADB and Mozilla bug 2083449. We tested the iRules on BIG-IP 17.5.1.9 in our lab. We did not test production capacity, or behavior across many TMMs under real load. The iRules are licensed under the Apache License 2.0. The iRules and the data group are supplied as they are, with no warranty. You are responsible for tests in your environment. We will update this page when a root program changes its decision on eMudhra, or when we change the CA list. We last changed the CA list on November 17, 2026.